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ABSTRACT
Burrow, Nathaniel Michael. Expanding the conceptualization and applied role of shame.
Published Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 2022.
Prior research has shown shame to be a key component of a variety of mental health
issues, symptoms, and disorders; however, a growing body of research also found it to be
integral in the process of seeking to atone, ameliorate, or repair a prior transgression. This study
sought to further explore what factors influenced this process. By utilizing a posttest-only control
group experimental design and the Gausel and Leach (2011) model as a framework, this study
was able to operationalize and investigate the role shame had in motivating a prosocial versus
self-defensive response. Additionally, this study advanced this model by testing the potential
moderating impact of social competence. Results of a 131 participants indicated that people
generally reported strong intentions to behave prosocially regardless of feeling ashamed and,
furthermore, did not find evidence that social competence moderated this process. The data did
demonstrate associations between secure attachment and the Gausel and Leach model’s prosocial
pathway and found a significant relationship between shame-proneness and the self-defensive
pathway.
Keywords: shame, shame-proneness, social competence, prosocial motivation, selfdefensive motivation, and attachment
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Simone O’Broin (also known as Simone Burns) was an international lawyer and activist
who dedicated her career to fighting for refugees and displaced people primarily in the Middle
East. Despite her ongoing battle with skin cancer, she dedicated numerous years of her life to
providing a voice to those who are largely unheard. Unfortunately, O’Broin became intoxicated
on an Air India flight, which resulted in her delivering a racist rant to the crew members
(Liphshiz, 2019). This verbal tirade was captured on film and caught the attention of the masses
through viral video sharing. She was shamed on a global scale for her harsh words and
intoxication, which resulted in her taking her own life days after being released from prison.
Since the rise of social media, O’Broin was but one of many people who have been publicly
shamed and vilified for their lapse in judgement (Ronson, 2015). Money and Pridmore (2017)
investigated historic accounts of suicide throughout millennia and concluded that shame was not
only a significant factor but also the predominant motivation for not wanting to live. Regardless
of where one stands on the character of O’Broin or others who have suffered the experience of
public shame, it is peculiar to understand how people respond to what could be a crippling and
debilitating emotional state. Why do some tend to repair the past transgression while others like
O’Broin choose to isolate and withdraw? At this time, the current literature could not definitively
answer this question.
What do we currently know about shame and its influence on behavior? Since the 1980s,
the research on shame has grown exponentially with the work of H. B. Lewis (1971) remaining
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as a dominant foundation. In her book Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, Lewis differentiated
between shame and guilt by stating that the former was concerned with one’s self-image, while
the latter was focused outwardly on one’s behaviors. Furthermore, Lewis emphasized that shame
was the “sleeper in psychopathology” and stressed that this emotion was perhaps one of the most
intense experiences of pain due to its feelings of worthlessness, inferiority, and debilitating
behavioral correlates. This conceptualization not only seemed plausibly accurate but also
paralleled many other works that placed shame at the center of psychopathology (Muris &
Meesters, 2014; Scheff & Retzinger, 2002; Tangney et al., 1992). Brown (2006), who wrote
Shame Resilience Theory, defined shame as “an intensely painful feeling or experience of
believing we are flawed and therefore unworthy of acceptance and belonging” (p. 45). Lamia
(2011), who has written multiple works on shame, described this emotion as a “deterioration of
an esteemed sense of self (that) can be devastating” (para. 9). The author emphasized that shame
motivates an excessive need to isolate or hide from others, thus rendering a cyclical spiral of
intense self-loathing.
However, a growing body of literature suggested a functional conceptualization of shame
provides strong evidence to suggest it is also central to motivating prosocial behaviors (for a
review, see Cibich et al., 2016). While it might seem odd for a single emotion to influence
drastically opposing behaviors, de Hooge et al. (2008) were among the first to provide strong
empirical evidence, via the unanimous results of four experiments, to suggest shame might act as
a commitment device to making social reparations for past transgressions. These findings were
consistent with a handful of other studies that utilized experimental designs to arrive at similar
conclusions (Gausel et al., 2012, 2016; Menesini & Camodeca, 2008; Olthof, 2012). For
example, Ahmed and Braithwaite (2006) investigated the role shame had in bullying and found
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the acknowledgement of shame predicted less bullying whereas the avoidance of shame
predicted future transgressions. Similarly, Manzi and González (2007) conducted a longitudinal
study that found Chileans’ experiences of shame were positively correlated with forgiveness and
negatively associated with anger toward the identified out-group.
Indeed, Leach and Cidam (2015) conducted a meta-analytic review of shame and the
dichotomy of its conceptualizations. These authors not only confirmed that shame fulfilled both
roles in the literature but also emphasized that a prosocial response was indicative of making
reparations and approaching social situations while a dysfunctional response was more
associated with withdrawal and self-defensive behaviors. The question in context regarding
shame’s conceptualization changed from “if” it is functional to “when” and what factors
moderated a prosocial response. Gausel and Leach (2011) provided a model that focused on the
combination of specific feelings and appraisals to explain and predict when a person decided to
engage in social approach versus self-defensive behaviors. While the Gausel and Leach model
demonstrated empirical soundness (Gausel et al., 2012, 2016), the current study sought to expand
its effectiveness and accuracy through the use of other salient works whose tenets were not
explained by the model. In so doing, this study not only added to the literature’s theoretical
understanding of this complex emotion but also expanded on shame’s applied role in human
behavior.
Theoretical Framework
In 1962, Silvan S. Tomkins (2008) published his first of four volumes on what later
became known as affect theory. Affect theory is based on a blueprint that contains four
assumptions; collectively, they emphasize that people are motivated to maximize positive affect
and minimize negative affect. The later three volumes expanded on Tomkins’s tenets of affect
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theory, which were eventually published together as a four volume set in 2008. Tomkins
believed people focus on exercising behaviors that bring them joy and excitement, all the while
purposefully avoiding or ameliorating feelings such as shame, distress, anger, and fear.
According to affect theory (Tomkins, 2008), these specific emotions are distinct and represent a
range of synonymous feelings. Due to the five senses, humans experience a myriad of stimuli on
a moment-by-moment basis. Tomkins theorized that the “affect system” manages and organizes
this constant influx of stimuli through selective amplification. When certain stimuli reach a
threshold, the affect system assigns meaning to that stimulus through a specific affect. That
affect, in combination with cognitions, motivates a response. For example, consider that while
you are reading this text, there is a knock at the door. While your five senses might be stimulated
by a host of various stimuli in the room (e.g., smells, images, reading various words), the knock
at the door takes precedence because the affect system assigned specific meaning to it such as
interest or excitement. Amplification of affect is designated toward the most pressing source of
information in the moment, which Tomkins emphasized was a key element of survival for the
human species.
With specific regard to shame, Tomkins (2008) stressed that this affect served as a
“protective mechanism” to alert people that something was interfering with the experience of
positive affect within our interpersonal relationships. Since individuals are motivated to seek
positive affect, shame provides critical social feedback so people do not pursue this goal at the
expense of others. At its foundation, shame is an incomplete reduction of interest or joy felt in
direct relation to social alienation, defeat, and/or indignity. Tomkins specifically emphasized the
role of shame in human development because it was a central affect that shaped how people
organize information. This process is called script formation, which heavily resembles what
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other cognitive theorists would call schema development. The scripts people form are heavily
dependent upon their first social system, which for most is their family of origin. Although its
inception was almost 10 years before the formal classification of attachment styles (Ainsworth &
Bell, 1970), Tomkins’s tenets of shame and script formation strongly paralleled the elements of
parent-child attachment development. According to attachment theory (Levy et al., 2011), four
attachment styles signify a secure or insecure relationship with caregivers. While a secure
attachment style is reflective of low avoidance and anxiety, insecure attachment styles are
reflective of varying amounts of high avoidance and anxiety.
In affect theory, Tomkins (2008) relied on the works of Robertson, Bowlby, and Harlow
(prominent attachment theorists) to suggest that children form scripts within the parent-child
relationship including sets of rules, evaluations, predications, and interpretations that allow
humans to analyze and navigate the world around them with efficiency. Tomkins argued that
caregivers and their children seek to maximize positive affect (and thus minimize negative
affect) within the parent-child relationship and based on the dynamics of this relationship, they
adopt a foundation for a secure or insecure script.
Pathology results when the caregiver is inconsistent in accomplishing the affect theory
blueprint; thus, the behaviors that characterize insecure attachment become cyclical (Kelly &
Lamia, 2018). Still trying to seek positive affect, the child learns how to satisfy their needs by
doing anything necessary to feel good. Shame becomes an integral part of this process because
its amplification provides critical feedback on how to best attain positive affect. For example, a
child might develop a script that they want toys at the grocery store. With the intent to maximize
positive affect, that child might take whatever toy(s) they so choose as this would most likely
trigger excitement and joy. Of the negative affects distress, disgust, fear, and anger, shame more
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than any other emotion provides integral feedback that stealing violates the boundaries of others.
Naturally, there is substantial potential for the development of a script that fulfills short-term
positive affect at the expense of more sustained happiness. Shame provides this feedback
because its experience is felt in direct relation to one’s sense of self and social belonging.
From an affect theory perspective, it appeared as if the dichotomy in the literature
between shame’s maladaptive and prosocial potential might be largely based on the scripts or
attachment style that one forms with their primary caregivers. In reviewing the literature on
attachment and shame, the general findings pointed to shame being widely associated with
insecure styles more than a secure attachment style (Gross & Hansen, 2000; Lopez et al., 1997;
Muris et al., 2014). These results seemed largely in favor of a maladaptive viewpoint of shame;
however, upon closer inspection, these studies assessed shame and attachment through the
construct of shame-proneness. Shame-proneness was defined in the literature as one’s general
disposition to experience shame (de Hooge, 2014; Dempsey, 2017). Sometimes referred to as
trait-shame or dispositional-shame, shame-proneness is more reflective of a personality
characteristic than a situational experience or state of being ashamed. From an affect theory
perspective, if shame-proneness represents one’s general tendency to become ashamed, then it
must also reflect one’s continual failure to attain positive affect. Therefore, shame-proneness
mirrors an unhealthy script and likely an insecure attachment style because it effectively reflects
a general tendency to feel unworthy or hopeless in attaining positive affect with others. Looking
at these results through the lens of affect theory, they do not seem surprising; however, what
about situational experiences of shame? Surely not all or even most people score high on shameproneness scales.
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Meesters et al. (2017) investigated the relationship between shame and parental rearing
behaviors. While this study investigated parental rearing behaviors and not attachment
specifically, the results concluded that for adolescents aged 11 to 18 years, higher scores of
shame were found with both rejecting and warm parenting. This seemed surprising considering
that warmth from caregivers is generally associated with positive outcomes (Ruckstaetter et al.,
2017); however, this study did not measure shame-proneness through traditional methods but
rather through the use of the Self-Conscious Emotions: Maladaptive and Adaptive Scales (Stegge
& Ferguson, 1994). Despite this measure’s focus to assess shame-proneness, it differentiated
between adaptive and maladaptive forms of shame, which seemed to provide some plausibility to
assume that shame might serve prosocial functions within the parent-child relationship. The
current study investigated the potential relationship between shame and attachment styles when
trait shame is differentiated from shame-proneness.
Factors that Motivate a Prosocial Response
In addition to attachment, what other factors influence one’s script to attain positive
affect through prosocial behaviors as opposed to self-defensive? In their meta-analysis, Leach
and Cidam (2015) highlighted a series of studies conducted by de Hooge et al. (2010, 2011) that
found social competence to be the most robust moderator to date that explained one’s motivation
following a shameful experience to engage in prosocial behaviors. These authors induced shame
across seven experiments through laboratory manipulation, collective “imagine if” stories, and
autobiographical recall. Regardless of the induction method, participants were asked to rate on a
Likert-type scale how much they felt shame and similar emotions to effectively conduct a
manipulation check of shame as an operationalized construct. Their results unanimously
indicated the participants were more likely to engage in social approach than withdrawal
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behaviors when they felt they had influence to positively impact the situation. When participants
perceived the reparation attempt as too risky, they most often opted for social withdrawal. These
studies were foundational in further solidifying shame’s prosocial functionality and, furthermore,
provided preliminary evidence to predict when a person was most likely to engage in reparative
efforts. Curiously enough, with the exception of autobiographical recall, all participants were
induced with a competence-based shame transgression.
Recall how the general body of literature differentiated shame and guilt by emphasizing
how the former was focused on self-image while the latter was more concerned with behaviors.
The prosocial results de Hooge et al. (2010, 2011) found were strongly based off of a
participant’s response following academic failures (e.g., fumbling through a presentation for
class) and so one might criticize these findings for inaccurately measuring feelings of guilt
following one’s behavior despite their manipulation checks saying otherwise. This seemed
plausible considering Tangney and Dearing (2002) found college students largely could not
differentiate between guilt and shame when asked to recall an experience and labelled these two
similar emotions inaccurately. Additionally, while the larger body of literature viewed shame as
a maladaptive, results heavily weighed in the opposite direction in support of guilt motivating
prosocial responses (Dempsey, 2017; Stuewig et al., 2015; Tignor & Colvin, 2017). In light of
these findings, understanding when and why people choose to engage in prosocial instead of
self-defensive behaviors seemed to be far from conclusive.
Gausel and Leach (2011) emphasized that since shame is reflective of a state wherein one
feels a threat to their self or social image, inducing shame through a moral-based transgression
was a more accurate method to invoking a pure shame experience. Indeed, the literature seemed
to support this viewpoint—that morality is of the highest priority to one’s evaluation of
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themselves (Leach et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 2005). According to the Gausel and Leach model (see
Appendix A), the experience of committing a moral transgression included two appraisals (othercondemnation and self-defect) and three feeling combinations (inferiority, rejection, and shame)
that yielded either a prosocial or self-defensive response. Following a moral transgression, when
people perceive the event as a concern for “other’s condemnation,” they are more likely to also
feel rejected. According to Gausel and Leach, an appraisal-feeling combination of
condemnation-rejection most often leads to self-defensive behaviors. Conversely, when one feels
ashamed for the transgression, this is most often felt in combination with an appraisal that one is
flawed or possesses a defect. When that person feels like this defect is unalterable (e.g., “I will
never be enough for my family”), they are more than likely feeling inferior as opposed to
ashamed. While the appraisal-feeling combination of self-defect and inferiority could lead to
prosocial behaviors, the strongest predictor of reparation efforts was found when a person felt
ashamed and appraised the situation as malleable.
The Gausel and Leach model (2011) was based on an accumulation of suggestions and
independent conclusions drawn about the constructs of shame, inferiority, rejection, and a
concern for self- versus social-image. Cibich et al. (2016) criticized this model for positing that
one could not feel shame without inferiority or rejection, thus limiting the model’s effectiveness
to be applied to real-world scenarios. Indeed, Tomkins (2008) emphasized that affects typically
occurred within a combination of each other. For example, it was strongly emphasized that
shame often occurred with anger. While one could argue this model is too specific, the opposing
view might contend that the dichotomy in the literature regarding shame was a direct result of its
complexity and ambiguity. Therefore, to understand this emotion, the Gausel and Leach model
provided a strong theoretical framework from which to best understand shame’s multifaceted
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composition. In reviewing independent studies on shame, it seemed evident that the results on
shame’s functionality largely paralleled the tenets of the Gausel and Leach model. For example,
de Hooge et al. (2008) found consistent results across a series of four studies where participants
consistently reported they preferred to make reparations when others were unaware of who was
ameliorating the transgression. This seemed to largely substantiate Gausel and Leach’s claims
that prosocial behavior is motivated from a concern for self-image, not social-image, as it
represents a state where one appraises the self-defect as malleable. Moreover, other studies
supported these findings, citing self-compassion and malleability as key elements in making
reparations following a shame-inducing situation (Breines & Chen, 2012; Dweck & Molden,
2005; Goetz et al., 2010).
Additionally, the Gausel and Leach model (2011) has been tested across four experiments
(Gausel et al., 2012, 2016). While the first set of experiments investigated a community sample
of Norwegians about their in-group discrimination against a minority group, the second set
strengthened the predictive reliability and validity of pathways among appraisals, feelings, and
behavioral motivation. Unanimous results of factor analyses across these studies showed the two
appraisals (condemnation and self-defect) and three feelings (inferiority, rejection, and shame)
were distinct and independent constructs, and the feeling-appraisal combinations successfully
predicted behavior motivation. The Gausel and Leach model provided a substantial foundation to
understanding who engages in prosocial behaviors following a moral failure (Gausel et al.,
2012), and further provided evidence to predict when this occurred (Gausel et al., 2016). The
purpose of this study was to further substantiate these claims and to better understand the why for
these results by utilizing affect theory and other relevant literature (de Hooge et al., 2010, 2011).
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Study Rationale and Purpose
So how do people respond to shame? Upon investigating the work of de Hooge et al.
(2010, 2011), Gausel and Leach (2011), and Tomkins (2008), it seemed evident that shame and
one’s response to it were dependent upon a handful of factors. Tomkins theorized shame had the
potential to serve both adaptive and maladaptive functions because through its amplification,
shame signaled motivation to attain positive affect through socially acceptable means. Despite
the larger body of literature showing evidence that people who consistently failed at achieving
positive affect and, thus, experienced shame more frequently (shame-proneness) tended to
withdraw and isolate (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). De Hooge et al. (2008, 2010, 2011) provided
substantial evidence that people could also ameliorate this uncomfortable emotion through
prosocial behaviors. Gausel and Leach offered a model that demonstrated a predictive pathway
to either a prosocial or self-defensive response based on specific appraisal-feeling combinations.
Despite these salient works, the current state of the literature largely supported a dysfunctional
perspective of shame that favored guilt’s adaptability at the expense of a more rounded
conceptualization of shame (for a review, see Dempsey, 2017; Tignor & Colvin, 2017).
Moreover, within the small body of literature that supported a functionalist viewpoint, the results
were far from conclusive.
The entirety of work composed by de Hooge et al. (2008, 2010, 2011, 2018) largely
measured shame in response to competence-based scenarios; however, since shame is felt within
the context of one’s self-image, moral-based transgressions seem to threaten the self-concept
more than academic failures. According to the prevailing perspectives on guilt and shame
(Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), one could also suggest that academic failures are
indeed more reflective of a behavior and, thus, reflective of guilt as opposed to shame.
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Additionally, since the scripts one forms about shame are heavily embedded within the parentchild relationship (Tomkins, 2008), it stands to reason attachment styles have some relationship
to this process. The current literature on attachment and shame was heavily focused on shameproneness, instead of situational or state shame experiences, which Dempsey (2017) heavily
stressed were two different concepts. If shame-proneness is reflective of what Tomkins (2008)
theorized as an unhealthy script, then it is no wonder shame-proneness is associated with
psychopathology. De Hooge et al. (2018) made a call to the literature to investigate shameproneness in light of shame’s newfound evidence to support this differentiation between state
shame and shame-proneness.
The current study sought to answer this call and these gaps in the literature, thus
expanding the understanding of shame as an uncomfortable, yet functional emotion. The purpose
of the current study was twofold: the first objective was to add to the literature on how shame is
conceptualized while the second goal was to expand our understanding of how shame impacts
behavior motivation. This study utilized methodology that closely paralleled Gausel et al. (2012,
2016) to investigate whether shame influenced prosocial behaviors following a moral
transgression. This study then incorporated de Hooge et al. (2010)’s methodology from their fifth
experiment to investigate if competence had a moderating role between a moral failure and
prosocial behaviors. In addition to investigating shame’s applied role in human behavior, this
study also expanded the literature’s conceptualization of shame by not only differentiating it
from shame-proneness but also testing affect theory’s tenets of the parent-child relationship by
analyzing to what extent attachment styles were associated with one’s shame response. In
utilizing the Gausel and Leach model (2011) and the tenets of affect theory, this study avoided
the error of attributing results of shame to other constructs such as guilt, inferiority, or rejection.
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Regardless of significant results, the findings gleaned from this study either supported an old
conceptualization of shame (dysfunctional), new conceptualization of shame (functional), or a
combination of both, yielding imperative conclusions and implications for future research.
Research Questions
Q1

How does a moral failure impact behavioral motivation?

Q2

To what extent does competence moderate the relationship between a moral
transgression and prosocial behavior?

Q3

Is a strong attachment style associated with the prosocial predictive pathways of
the Gausal and Leach Model?

Q4

Is shame-proneness associated with the self-defensive predictive pathways of the
Gausal and Leach Model?
Definition of Terms

Inferiority. An emotional state where one feels like their failure is the result of a global, and
thus unalterable, self-defect (Gausel & Leach, 2011). Inferiority was measured by the
following two Likert-type items used by Gausel et al. (2016): “I feel inferior to others
reflecting on what happened” and “I feel vulnerable thinking about what happened.”
Other Condemnation. An appraisal where one perceives a threat to one’s social bond. This
appraisal leads people to believe they might be punished by marginalization,
ostracization, and/or exclusion (Gausel & Leach, 2011). Other condemnation was
measured by the following three Likert-type items used by Gausel et al. (2016): “Others
might not have the same respect for me because of this,” “I can be rejected by others
because of what I have done,” and “I think I can be isolated from others because of this.”
Prosocial Motivation. The intention to improve social affected by the transgression (Gausel &
Leach, 2011). Prosocial motivation was measured by the following six Likert-type items
used by Gausel et al. (2016): “I would try to repair some of the damage I have caused my
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friend,” “I would feel I should compensate my friend for what has happened,” “I feel I
should compensate my friend (e.g. offer emotional support),” “If I could I would like to
tell my friend how sorry I feel,” “It would be important that my friend knew that I felt
bad about this,” and “I would like to express my concerns to my friend.”
Rejection. An emotion state where one feels a threat of social isolation engendered by a moral or
other failure (Gausel & Leach, 2011). Rejection was measured by the following three
Likert-type items used by Gausel et al. (2016): “I feel rejected thinking about what
happened,” “I feel alone thinking about what happened,” and “I feel rebuffed thinking
about what happened.”
Self-Defect. An appraisal reflective of personal flaw and/or concern for damage of one’s selfimage (Gausel & Leach, 2011). Self-defect was measured by the following two Likerttype items used by Gausel et al. (2016): “I think I am defective in some way” and “I think
this episode expresses a moral failure in me.”
Self-Defensive Motivation. A desire to physically or psychological withdraw and avoid social
relations that were affected by the transgression (Gausel & Leach, 2011). Self-defensive
motivation was measured by the following five Likert-type items used by Gausel et al.
(2016): “If I could I would like to avoid meeting people who know what I did,, “I would
rather not get mixed in discussions about what I did,” “I would not mind talking about
what I did (reverse score),” “If I met my friend, I would think of something else than
what I did,” and “I would like to forget about what I did and everything that happened.”
Shame. A situational experience of an uncomfortable emotion that provides feedback of a threat
to one’s self-image (de Hooge, 2014; Gausel & Leach, 2011; Tomkins, 2008). Shame
was measured using Gausel et al.’s (2012, 2016) methodology through the use of three
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Likert-type, self-report items: “I feel disgraced about this,” “I feel ashamed thinking
about what I had done,” and “I feel humiliated reflecting on this.”
Shame-Proneness. “A personality trait or general tendency to experience the emotion shame in
response to specific negative events (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 33).” Shameproneness was measured by the most widely used and psychometrically sound measure—
the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 as created by Tangney and Dearing (2002).
Social Competence. As defined by Bornstein et al. (2010), it is a term used to describe one’s
interpersonal skills and encompasses the application of self-regulation, social cognition,
positive communication, and prosocial relationships. Social competence was measured
by the following two Likert-type items used by de Hooge et al. (2010): “I have
confidence that I would complete that exercise well” and “I have control over the
outcome of that exercise.”
Summary
It seemed apparent that shame is one of the most primary of emotions involved in the
human experience. Currently, the literature remains split largely favoring a conceptualization
that shame is at the center of psychopathology or other aversive associations. Despite these
results, a substantial body of literature yielded results demonstrating shame’s functionality in
motivating prosocial behaviors. While this discrepancy in shame’s conceptualization seemed
largely attributed to the result of inaccurate measurement of other similar emotions such as guilt,
affect theory provided a framework to understand shame-proneness is indeed different from a
state of feeling ashamed. The current study sought to expand on this functional conceptualization
of shame by not only differentiating it from shame-proneness but also follow the tenets of affect
theory to investigate the role of attachment. Additionally, this study also utilized Gausel and

16
Leach’s (2011) model to investigate the role of social competence in moderating the relationship
between a moral transgression and prosocial behaviors. Regardless of significance, the results
from this study strengthened the predictive validity of the Gausel and Leach model and further
added to the limiting evidence of shame’s prosocial functionality. By providing a stronger
understanding of shame, researchers and practitioners alike could use this information to better
inform theory and practice.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The current study sought to investigate how shame motivated behaviors by specifically
measuring participant’s motivation to engage in either prosocial or self-defensive responses
following a moral transgression. This chapter provides a foundation for how to effectively study
these constructs by first offering an overview of affect theory and then discussing the current
split in the literature surrounding shame’s conceptualization. Affect theory provides a guide to
better understanding how the construct of shame itself has varied in conceptualization and how
to best operationalize its tenets to inform practice. Lastly, this chapter explores how the Gausel
and Leach (2011) model offered a predictive pathway to understanding a human response to
shame and other salient factors that have shown to be integral to this process.
Affect Theory
What became a four-volume set (Tomkins, 2008), affect theory provided a foundation
from which to understand human emotion, motivation, and behavior. First published in 1961, the
mainstream conceptualization of emotions was viewed through the lens of psychoanalysis and
the unconscious drives that motivated human behavior (Nathanson, 2008). Silvan S. Tomkins (as
cited by Nathanson, 2008) revolutionized the field’s prevailing views of how affect in
combination with cognitions, not unconscious drives, motivated human behaviors. Affect
theory’s theoretical foundation has been used as a framework by many renowned theorists such
as Paul Ekman (2004) and Antonio Damasio (1999). While Damasio’s theory of consciousness
focused on a three-part hierarchy of biological systems that formed the self, Ekman focused on
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facial expressions, whose concepts have dominated today’s understanding of emotions. Ekman’s
research not only inspired the award-winning television series Lie to Me but Ekman also served
as a scientific advisor on the popular movie Inside Out (Paul Ekman Group, 2020). Although
both Damasio and Ekman provided revolutionary work on the internal processes of emotions,
none focused on the role of shame nearly as much as Tomkins did, specifically in his second
volume. In his most cited work, Emotions Revealed, Ekman (2004) stated that while he knew
shame was an emotion that closely resembled embarrassment, guilt, and envy, he did not
compile research on shame or any of those emotions himself. As a result, Tomkin’s affect theory
remains the most encompassing and complete theoretical foundation to understanding the
process of shame and its impact on human functioning.
According to affect theory, all humans have affect and drive systems that work in tandem
with our cognitions to create meaning and motivation for behavior (Tomkins, 2008). The affect
system operates as a “gatekeeper” that allows certain stimuli to be analyzed. Tomkins (2008)
believed certain stimulation constants are present throughout our lives such as touch, sound, heat,
and light that could always be present and, thus, a source of information. The affect system
discriminates between the ever-present sources of stimulation and manages this information so
we can make sense of stimuli most important to us. For example, imagine being out on a safari
and seeing a lion come charging at you. Within this specific situation, you are more than likely
experiencing multiple stimulation via the five senses; however, the affect system allows us to
pay attention on purpose to the approaching lion because it is the most pressing source of
information in that moment. Tomkins argued that the survival of any living species is inexplicitly
connected to its ability to analyze new data and make meaning of it from past experiences.
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The affect system alerts us of the impending lion that is approaching but our drive to
survive and our cognitions work together to create a response. According to Tomkins (2008), all
biological drives (breathing, ingestion, excretion, sleep, and sexuality) alert us that an action
needs to happen at a specific site in the body. Our drive system wants us to survive the
impending attack from the lion but our affect provides stimulation management from which to do
that. Consider the drive of sexuality, Tomkins referred to this drive as the “paper tiger” because
it could not occur without amplification from affect. Additionally, he used the example of the
hunger drive to eat and provide our bodies with sustenance that could be easily dissuaded if we
are preoccupied, let’s say for example by an approaching lion. Tomkins said, “The affect system
is therefore the primary motivational system because without its amplification, nothing else
matters and with its amplification, anything else can matter” (p. 620). From this perspective, life
can be viewed as a sequence of stimulus-affect-response pairs wherein we are alerted of a
situation within the world around us and our systems acknowledge, assess, and decide on a
response. Tomkins was the first to emphasize the role affect had in managing stimuli and
motivating responses.
Innate Affects
According to Tomkins (2008), the human face serves as a window by which one views
the “affect system” via changes in musculature, enervation, characteristics of the skin, thermal
response, and microcirculation. As a result, affect theory was driven largely by taking pictures of
the human face and recording observations. For Tomkins, the face was a specialized
neuromuscular system where people’s fundamental nature as humans could be derived
(Nathanson, 2008). He primarily studied the faces of newborns and infants because their affects
were freer of previously assigned meaning to past experiences; thus, they could be studied more
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purely. Through this process, he identified nine primary affects: two positive affects, four
negative affects, two auxiliary affects, and one neutral affect. These affects did not reflect a
single emotion but rather a range of emotions that differed in their intensity. These affects were
identified respectively as enjoyment-joy, interest-excitement, distress-anguish, fear-terror, angerrage, shame-humiliation, disgust, dissmell, and surprise-startle.
While it was not the scope of this study to discuss all of these affects in detail, what was
important to understand was how each became amplified and whether the meaning they reflected
was positive, negative, or neutral (see Table 2.1). Enjoyment-joy denotes a feeling of relief
where something potentially challenging ends in joy or victory (Nathanson, 2008). While a
gradual decrease in stimulation of this affect amplified a relaxation response, a rapid decrease in
stimulus resulted in laughter. Interest-excitement is triggered when an increasing stimulus is fast
enough to be noticed but not too intense to be unpleasant. While we all are presented with a
multitude of stimuli throughout our daily life, only some are amplified enough to maintain
attention to them.
Table 2.1
Tomkins’ Nine Innate Affects
Affect
Positive

Response
Enjoyment-Joy
Interest-Excitement

Neutral

Surprise-Startle

Negative

Distress-Anguish
Fear-Terror
Anger-Rage
Shame-Humiliation
Disgust
Dissmell
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Distress-anguish becomes amplified when any stimulus is activated for too long.
Examples of this can be seen when one is in the extended presence of a loud noise, sun reflecting
off the snow, and traffic. Anger-rage occurs when this stimulus continues to occur despite our
attempts to thwart the negative affect in search of something more positive. Driving down the
highway with someone who is following behind too closely might be distressing at first;
however, if the problem persists and continues to escalate, one might begin to experience an
affect more closely related to anger-rage.
Fear-terror occurs when the stimulus overloads the affect system, thus becoming
amplified too fast or too much (Nathanson, 2008). Instead of distress-anguish and anger-rage,
which occur from a steady-state stimulus, fear-terror identifies rapidly increasing negative affect.
Tomkins (2008) noted that anxiety is often a milder form of fear-terror where we cannot
immediately assign a source.
Similar to fear-terror with regard to its rapid onset, surprise-startle is unique as it has the
power to clear the mind of whatever one was thinking prior to the stimulus acknowledged. It can
be both positive or negative. Dissmell and disgust were terms later added and coined by Tomkins
(2008) to explain displeasure with specific regard to hunger and thirst. Enjoyment-joy and
interest-excitement denote a positive experience while distress-anguish, fear-terror, anger-rage,
and shame-humiliation reflect a negative experience (Tomkins, 2008). It is important to
emphasize that these affects reflect a range based on intensity of that emotion. For example,
anger-rage also encompasses feeling aggressive, hostile, infuriated, and so-on. While a steadystate stimulus at one range of intensity triggers distress-anguish, a higher range of intensity
triggers anger-rage (Nathanson, 2008). Additionally, all of these affects differ in their physical
expression. For example, during fear-terror, individuals experience a pounding heart, blanched
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cheek, stiff muscles, and the face tends to turn a bit to the side; whereas, interest-excitement is
shown through raised eyebrows and a shift in eye focus that signals one tracking, looking, and
listening (Tomkins, 2008).
Shame-Humiliation
Shame-humiliation physically presents as acute vasodilation, lowering of the head, eyes
looking down, blushing, and reddening of the face, neck, and upper chest. While Freud (as cited
in Hazard, 1969) believed shame was an affect that served as a reaction formation to assist the
ego in inhibiting the exhibition of urination, the bowls, and one’s genitals, Tomkins (2008)
viewed this affect as a protective mechanism that alerts us that something is interfering with the
experience of a positive event. He stressed that in order for shame-humiliation to become
amplified by the affect system, the presence of a positive affect needed to be activated
beforehand. It is, therefore, an incomplete reduction of interest or joy.
More than any other affect, Tomkins (2008) revered shame-humiliation as a social
construct representative of indignity, defeat, and alienation. Throughout various works, Tomkins
found shame was an especially powerful motivator to achieve positive affect because shame
represents a loss in the perception of self. Shame becomes amplified by the affect system when
one receives feedback from their environment that they failed. Therefore, this means shamehumiliation provides integral information on social norms, boundaries, and values. Children
actively seek interest from their caregivers but when the caregiver fails to reciprocate, the child is
more than likely to feel ashamed. Tomkins stated that a person might also feel other affects such
as anger, disgust, or contempt during such a situation but one generally forms a pattern from
which they respond. When one continues to receive feedback that they failed and their efforts to
ameliorate the transgression yielded fruitless results, depression could ensue. Tomkins perceived
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depression as a syndrome of shame as it reduces the general amplification of other impulses. In
other words, shame-humiliation has the power to reduce the threshold by which the affect system
is triggered for all other affects. Tomkins emphasized that shame could occur over a broad range
of mild shame to paralyzing humiliation across a myriad of situations where one feels
disappointed, declared in one way or another less-than, and when one is taunted.
Script-Formation
According to Tomkins (2008), affects serve as amplifiers to a stimulus that signals
something requires our attention and further emphasized that affects provide meaning and
motivation to that stimulus through the process of script formation. Forming these scripts allows
us to organize a bundle of experiences into a storage system. For example, when we are young,
fear signals that crossing a busy street could be dangerous; however, as we grow and develop, we
adopt a script that enables us to cross traffic without fear. These scripts are similar to what
cognitive theorists might call schemas or what psychoanalysts refer to as compromise formations
(Kelly & Lamia, 2018). These scripts allow us to group memories and assemble these
experiences with cognitive skills such as sets of rules, evaluations, predictions, and/or
interpretations that allow us to analyze and navigate the world around us with efficiency
(Nathanson, 2008).
We began to form these scripts during infancy. Although Tomkins (2008) never cited
attachment styles per se, he did rely heavily on the work of Bowlby, Ainsworth, Harlow,
Robertson, and Zimmerman (as cited Bretherton, 1992) who pioneered the formation of
attachment theory. While Robertson and Bowlby worked together to observe hospitalized and
institutionalized children in 1948 (two years before Ainsworth’s arrival), attachment theory’s
first major volume Attachment was not published until 1969 (Bowlby, 1982). As a result, much
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of what Tomkins wrote with regard to script formation at infancy with one’s caregiver heavily
paralleled concepts of attachment theory but did not label it as such given that he published the
bulk of his work in 1962 and 1963. According to Tomkins, affect theory has four major
assumptions for script formation:
•

As humans, we are motivated to savor and maximize positive affect. We enjoy
what feels good and do what we can to find and maintain more of it.

•

We are inherently biased to minimize negative affect.

•

The system works best when we express all of our affects.

•

Anything that increases our power to accomplish these goals is good for mental
health, anything that reduces this power is bad for mental health.

Attachment and Affect Theory
Ainsworth and Bell (1970) devised an assessment technique called the Strange Situation
Classification to identify and categorize three attachment styles between children and their
mothers: secure, insecure avoidant, and insecure ambivalent. These attachment styles reflected a
deep emotional bond with caregivers that had strong implications for how one approached
relationships in the future (Levy et al., 2011; Woodhouse et al., 2015). The method of
categorization was based on how a child responded to their caregiver and how they went about
getting their needs met. The relationship was defined as secure when the child developed an
internal working model that felt safe in knowing their caregiver would consistently respond to
their needs. Secure attachment styles were marked by the child’s low avoidance and anxiety.
Additionally, those with a secure attachment style were generally more comfortable with
intimacy as they were not nearly as worried about rejection in comparison to their insecure
attachment style counterparts (Levy et al., 2011). Insecure attachment styles could be either
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avoidant or anxious. Insecure-avoidant styles denoted low anxiety but high avoidance. These
individuals were generally uncomfortable with closeness and primarily valued their autonomy
and independence in being more distant from their partners. Insecure-anxious reflected low
avoidance but high anxiety. Individuals with this style craved closeness and intimacy; however,
they were often worried and doubtful of who they could trust which also kept them at a distance
from social relationships.
Main and Solomon (1986) later identified a fourth style, insecure-disorganized, which
reflected both high avoidance and anxiety. Not only are these individuals more prone to emotion
dysregulation but are also generally antisocial and lack empathy. Moreover, it is especially
difficult for these individuals to tolerate intimacy with another (Levy et al., 2011). The main
conclusion of attachment theory was the child’s perception of sensitivity felt from their caregiver
was the primary determinate of their attachment style.
Criticisms of attachment theory stated that one’s attachment style was not based solely on
these concepts but also the child’s temperament (Belsky & Bovine, 1987; Kagan et al., 1984).
These criticisms were largely based on the premise that a child’s temperament might invoke a
negative response from their caregivers, which served as a more primary determinant of their
developed attachment style. Tomkins (2008) not only accepted the role that temperament played
in the formation of one’s attachment but also stressed that culture could greatly impact the
parent-child relationship as well. Through the lens of script formation, Tomkins (2008)
paralleled attachment theory by emphasizing the scripts we formed as infants were heavily
dependent on the relationships we had with our caregivers as they were our primary source of
information and learning. He emphasized that since all humans are motivated to maximize
positive affect, caregivers and infants also seek to fulfill this goal within their parent-child
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relationships. As a result, both the child and the caregiver’s affects trigger each other through a
process Tomkins called interaffectivity.
Interaffectivity and the formation of scripts are developed via parent-child interactions.
Tomkins noticed the caregiver would often smile, laugh, and make hand gestures with the
purpose of invoking a positive affect with the baby. This process was twofold as the caregiver
was motivated to increase positive affect by making their baby happy and, further, the baby was
motivated to produce positive affect by interacting with their caregiver. Unless a negative affect
disinhibited this process (e.g., distress from the affect system amplifying the need to attain sleep
or food), the baby would often mirror the caregiver’s positive affect with enjoyment-joy or
interest-excitement. Through the process of interaffectivity, both child and caregiver were able to
maximize positive affect with one another. Tomkins (2008) argued interaffectivity formed the
basis for one’s ability to empathize. By suggesting people were motivated by affect, affect theory
provided a framework from which to understand that attachment styles were determined by
temperament and caregiver sensitivity. The more the child developed a script, their caregiver can
consistently help them enhance positive affect and decrease negative affect, the more that script
resembled a secure attachment style (low avoidance, low anxiety).
Pathology
Affect theory postulates that both the child and their caregiver are motivated to remove
whatever is blocking positive affect from occurring. Consider the situation wherein the child
expresses distress-anguish wherein the caregiver, now also experiencing distress-anguish,
attempts to increase positive affect for the child, thereby increasing positive affect from
themselves. Through this process of interaffectivity, the child develops a foundation for
empathy. If the caregiver is inconsistent or the child’s temperament inhibits both individuals
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from accomplishing this goal, the behaviors that characterize insecure attachment scripts become
cyclical (Kelly & Lamia, 2018). The child then begins to learn how to increase positive affect
through the attainment of basic needs via inconsistent and perhaps even unpleasant ways.
According to affect theory, the child begins to learn how to satisfy their affect needs by doing
anything necessary to feel good. This pattern offers a strong potential for pathology.
Recall how negative affects become triggered by the presence of an unwanted stimulus.
What separates shame-humiliation from the other negative affects is shame alerts us when
something impedes our ability to connect with another. It is the incomplete reduction of a
positive affect, meaning there was a positive affect to begin with. In alerting us that something
impedes our ability to connect with others, shame-humiliation also acts as a mechanism that
helps us reduce behaviors that could potentially lead to future rejection or isolation (Kelly &
Lamia, 2018). In other words, shame-humiliation alerts us there is something impeding our
ability to attain positive affect and thus motivates us to restore equilibrium (Tomkins, 2008).
To better understand how one responds to shame, it is imperative to have a concrete
conceptualization of what shame is and how it differs from other similar emotions such as guilt.
Throughout his works, Tomkins (2008) gravitated away from traditional concepts of emotions
and instead focused on the larger range of feelings that composed a distinct affect. According to
affect theory, shame is a part of the larger affect: shame-humiliation. As I review in the next
section of this chapter, shame has shown to be different from other synonymous emotions
Tomkins might have organized into the broad shame-humiliation affect and so, for the purpose
of measuring shame accurately, this study integrated more contemporary work on the
conceptualization of shame. From affect theory, it seems evident that shame is an integral
component of human behavior as well as development because it is felt within the context of
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committing a failure that violates interpersonal relationships. Whether it is the child who is
neglected by their caregivers or the client who was recently turned down by a love interest,
shame is a powerful source of feedback and information that alerts us of an inadequacy. While
Tomkins posited that shame motivates people to attain positive affect, he also theorized it could
lead to a formation of a script that is saturated in feelings of depression. So, what have others
found in regard to shame’s applied role in human behavior and conceptualization and how has
the construct of shame been viewed over the past five decades?
Contemporary Views of Shame
Since the inception of affect theory, shame gained prominence in the literature beginning
in the late 1980s. Authors like Breñe Brown (2012) popularized shame as the “secret behind
many forms of broken behaviors.” In fact, Brown’s concepts and ideas of shame have earned her
the top five of the most watched TED Talks of all time, New York Times best-sellers list, and a
Netflix documentary. It seems apparent shame has attracted worldwide interest and yet, our
knowledge of this affect leaves much to be determined. Brown (2006) defined shame as “an
intensely painful feeling or experience of believing we are flawed and therefore unworthy of
acceptance and belonging” (p. 45). Similarly, Tangney (1991) conceptualized shame as an “ugly
feeling” (p. 600) that is reflective of feeling incompetent. Schoenleber and Berenbaum (2012)
adopted this perspective of shame and found it was among the most primary of emotions found
in personality disorders and that inaccurate regulation of shame was central to the development
and maintenance of psychopathology. This might seem similar to how Tomkins (2008) defined
shame as an affect of indignity; however, it seemed apparent that while Tangney and others
conceptualized shame as a negative emotion, Tomkins theorized it was integral in motivating one
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to repair positive affect. This nuance in definitions is reflective of the larger split in the literature
where one side perceives shame as problematic and the other focuses on its functionality.
Shame: Functional or Problematic
A multitude of studies point to shame being at the center of psychopathology (Scherer &
Wallbott, 1994; Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012). Shame has been associated with a myriad of
disorders such as social anxiety disorder (Fergus et al., 2010; Gilbert, 2000; Hedman et al.,
2013), depression (Cheung et al., 2004; Gilbert, 2000; Orth et al., 2006), suicidality (Hastings et
al., 2002; Kalafat & Lester, 2000; Lester, 1997), borderline personality disorder (Brown et al.,
2009; Rüsch, Lieb et al., 2007), and eating disorders (Keith et al., 2009; Swan & Andrews,
2003). The majority of these works followed Tangney’s (1991) conceptualization of shame
reflecting a state wherein one feels exposed, devalued, and unattractive. Vanderheiden and
Mayer (2017) stated that shame is often associated in the literature along with feelings of intense
self-denial, dependency on extrinsic sources of self-esteem, and powerlessness.
Lewis (1971) was among the first to propel this problematic view of shame where the
author conducted a study of two patients who differed in their dependency on service providers.
The dependent patient demonstrated significantly more shame as they made substantially more
references to humiliation, embarrassment, ridicule, and exposure to private detail than the
independent patient. The conclusions drawn from this study pointed to shame being a
foundational emotion among those who struggled more with psychopathology. These ideas were
investigated by Tangney et al. (1992) who found that on a larger scale (two studies, collectively
assessing 489 participants) when shame occurred more pervasively and across a longer period of
time, it negatively impacted one’s interpersonal relationships. These authors inferred from the
data that this might be due, in part, to impaired empathetic abilities, tendency to externalize
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blame, and frequent anger outbursts. This extended the view on shame as being maladaptive as
the data showed that people who experienced prolonged periods of shame seemed to also be
more susceptive to a plethora of other psychological symptoms such as those mentioned above.
Furthermore, Tangney et al. discussed how painful the experience of shame was and this emotion
could lead to a crippling of adaptive self-functions, increased hopelessness, and more feelings of
shame.
As the research on shame progressed, it seemed to portray this emotion as indicative of
defeat, personal flaw, and motivated an escape response (Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing,
2002). Gilbert (2000) found results that indicated shame, social anxiety, and depression were all
highly related to feelings of inferiority and submissive behaviors. It was interesting to note that
Gilbert (2000) began to view shame more adaptively, positing that shame helps us flee from
social humiliation. The author viewed this functionality with specific regard to maintaining one’s
social rank or avoiding potential aversive experience to one’s rank order. Others adopted a
similar view wherein shame functioned as an emotion that invoked certain action tendencies
such as communicating awareness of the transgression with intention of avoiding further
rejection or attack (Fessler, 2004; Keltner & Gross, 1999).
Scheff (1988) stressed that shame served as a monitoring tool for cultures to help increase
social control. The author emphasized that when utilized in this way, one’s experience could lead
to a fury of humiliation or shame-rage. It seemed like these views paralleled, to some degree, the
tenets of affect theory (Tomkins, 2008); however, these perspectives seemed to overlook the
larger, more functional view of shame. Those who adopted an evolutionary perspective on shame
might view it as similar to fear. Fear, also a negative affect according to Tomkins (2008), is
capable of serving complex functions. Marks (1987) examined fear from an evolutionary
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perspective and emphasized it could alert us of danger but when prolonged or without cause, it
could be disadvantageous.
Similar to Scheff (1988), Tangney et al. (2007) suggested shame functioned as a moral
barometer that provides feedback on our social and moral acceptability. Indeed, de Hooge
(2014) echoed this idea calling shame a sociometer that serves as a feedback system to one’s
ability to meet the values and standards of social groups. Cibich et al. (2016) also found
significant research indicating shame was associated with a reconciliation of behaviors, a key
factor in processing through transgressions, amelioration of relationship difficulties, and was a
motivator for the fulfillment of social roles in society. These positive characteristics of shame
were also confirmed by a handful of studies that investigated shame’s diverse functionality and
found it could motivate efforts to appease others and to approach them with intention to repair
their social image (Ahmed et al., 2001; Fessler, 2004; Leach et al., 2015; Mosquera et al., 2016).
Kelly and Lamia (2018) advocated for clinicians to not stray away from shame in therapy but to
use shame’s positive aspects to motivate people to learn, grow, and change themselves.
In a series of four experiments, de Hooge et al. (2008) provided foundational evidence in
opposition of Tangney’s (1991) ugly conceptualization of shame. De Hooge et al. induced shame
via three different methods: collective “imagine if” stories, autobiographical recall of a personal
event, and laboratory manipulation. In each experiment, the authors randomly assigned
participants to a shame or control group and measured prosocial behavior through a “give-some
dilemma” that presented the individual with the opportunity to give more (and thus receive more
in return) or keep the money for themselves. Across all experiments, the authors unanimously
found they accurately induced shame more than any other emotion and it alone motivated
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prosocial behavior. The fourth experiment also found motivation to engage in prosocial behavior
was applicable to everyday situations, which generalized findings.
It was interesting to see how varying perspectives of shame could co-exist among
experts. Tomkins (2008) emphasized that when a negative affect is amplified by the affect
system, this signals something is blocking an ability to attain positive affect. With regard to
shame-humiliation, this process occurs within our social relationships signaling we have violated
a group norm. Since the function of shame is to motivate us to reinstate positive affect, it seems
evident this attainment could occur through both prosocial and maladaptive means. For example,
Brown et al. (2008) found one’s response to shame could involve blaming the victim and/or
avoiding the situation entirely. This finding and others have shown that a strong relationship
between shame and aversive behaviors seems to make sense through the lens of affect theory as
people are motivated to seek positive affect and, thus, try to accomplish this goal through both
problematic and functional methods.
Narrowing the Conceptualization
of Shame
Upon reviewing the literature’s split conceptualization of this emotion, it seemed
apparent that shame has been found to be widely associated with a range of problematic
responses, while at the same time also viewed as an emotion that serves adaptive functions. This
split seemed to suggest shame could motivate a range of dysfunctional and functional behaviors.
How then do these opposing views co-exist? It seemed shame’s dichotomous roles endured
because of two primary misunderstandings. The first was shame’s close resemblance to other
emotions and the second was the difference between a single situation versus a prolonged
psychological trait. With regard to shame’s differences with other emotions, Gausel et al. (2012,
2016) found inferiority and rejection functioned differently from shame and accurately
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recognizing one from the other could help researchers predict how a person responded to a
shame-inducing event. Therefore, to understand shame’s functionality, it must be differentiated
from other constructs and differences between prolonged shame and situational shame must be
recognized. I now review emotions similar to shame and discuss their implications for predicting
behavior (see Table 2.2 as a reference for this section).

Table 2.2
Shame and Synonymous Emotions
Emotion
Shame

Definition
A situational experience or “state” of feeling dissatisfied and
vulnerable about one’s current self-image.

Guilt

A situational experience of feeling dissatisfied with one’s behavior

Embarrassment

A state of mortification that occurs when one demonstrates a
deficiency in often implicit social roles

Pride

An appraisal of one’s ability to be socially valuable

Rejection

A state of being in opposition with another

Inferiority

A state of feeling helpless where the stimulus that caused the
emotion is viewed as unable to be changed. (unalterable selfdefect

Shame-proneness

A personality characteristic that denotes a general tendency to feel
ashamed

Shame and Self-Conscious Emotions
While a plethora of emotions might be synonymous with shame, a few reflect a process
of self-reflection and/or self-evaluation. Guilt, shame, pride, and embarrassment are at their
core—emotions that are focused on one’s reactions to their character qualities and/or
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behaviors—thus, authors have used the term self-conscious emotions to describe them (Lewis,
1993; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). For example, when something bad happens, we might feel a
range of negative emotions such as sadness or anger but we feel shame in our own recognition of
these attributes or actions. Together, these emotions provide important and often critical
feedback to our self-worth and help us behave in ways that are socially and morally acceptable.
Perhaps the closest resembling emotion to shame, guilt, was viewed by Tomkins (2008):
“(They are) one and the same affect” (p. 351). Conversely, Tangney and Dearing (2002) wrote a
book titled Shame and Guilt on their nuanced differences. According to Tangney and Dearing,
Tomkins was far from the only expert who used shame and guilt interchangeably and stated that
these feelings could be conceptualized as self-conscious emotions because they helped people
abide by social norms or values. Interestingly, Tangney and Dearing emphasized how
participants incorrectly labelled such experiences as shame or guilt, which made these constructs
especially difficult to measure. When researchers were able to better empirically study these
constructs, Tangney and Dearing stressed that shame is often felt in specific regard to one’s
concept about the self, while guilt is felt in the context of specific behavior. This differentiation
reflected the work of Lewis (1971) who was among the first to differentiate shame and guilt
based on the focus of self-versus-behavior. These authors both stressed that shame is focused on
the evaluation one has about themselves while with guilt, the self is not the primary focus
(Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Guilt is focused on the thing done or undone. In
essence, guilt represents “I did a bad thing” while shame reflects “I am a bad person.”
With regard to embarrassment and pride, both provide feedback on our social belonging;
however, they are more easily differentiated from shame. While pride reflects an appraisal of
one’s ability to be socially valuable (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995), embarrassment denotes a state of
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mortification that occurs when one demonstrates a deficiency in often implicit social roles
(Goffman, 1956; Miller, 1995). While there have been many definitions of embarrassment, the
general body of literature reflected a state wherein the person’s identity is vulnerable and in need
of being monitored, hidden, or changed (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Miller (1995) found
embarrassment often occurred in situations where the individual made a social mistake such as
forgetting something, tripping, or unintended bodily induced noises. It parallels guilt in that it is
an emotion focused more on behavior than the self but, ultimately, is less morally relevant. In
other words, an innocent mistake or accident of social norms is less reflective of how valuable a
person is than committing a moral transgression (such as lying).
Inferiority
Perhaps the closest emotion Tomkins (2008) described to shame was “self-contempt,”
which he defined as a state of self-hatred. Lewis (1971) described this state of self-hatred as
inferiority and stressed it was a central component to the experience of shame. Both Lewis and
Tomkins described inferiority, or self-contempt, as a state of feeling like one has an unalterable
defect and, thus, sees others as superior in comparison to their perceived worthlessness. The
tenets of inferiority seem incredibly similar to those of shame. In fact, Smith et al. (2002) found
people often mistook shame for inferiority and vice versa. Gausel and Leach (2011) argued that
inferiority was distinct from shame because it represented a state of helplessness where the
stimulus that caused the emotion was viewed as unchangeable. These authors emphasized that
while similar, inferiority was reflective of a belief that one has an unalterable defect and, thus,
motivated self-defensive and/or withdrawal behaviors. Similarly, Leach and Spears (2008)
stressed that inferiority was an extreme state of passivity that often led to derogating or
devaluing those who were viewed as superior or without unalterable defect.
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Smith et al. (2002) highlighted that what separated shame from inferiority was a moral
component. These authors suggested people generally tended to not view uncontrollable selfdefects as something that was within one’s control; therefore, people were not blamed or held
responsible for those defects. With specific regard to differences in response to shame versus
inferiority, these authors found participants reported more self-defensive behaviors in relation to
feeling inferior than feeling ashamed. O’Connor et al. (1999) investigated the role of self-hate
and found that when shame was controlled for, self-hate was strongly associated with
psychopathology, hostility, and low self-esteem. Moreover, when Gausel et al. (2012, 2016)
conducted separate factor analyses for the Gausel and Leach (2011) model measurement items,
they found shame and inferiority were distinct constructs. Gausel and Leach (2011) emphasized
that the negative correlates of shame might actually be more accurate components of inferiority
since shame motivates a prosocial response and inferiority does not.
Rejection
Similarly, Gausel and Leach (2011) also proposed that feelings of rejection were different
from shame and found supporting evidence in subsequent studies that it was a distinct construct
(Gausel et al., 2012, 2016). These works were pivotal in the study of shame because Lewis
(1971) had emphasized felt rejection and shame’s similarity, stating shame was a state of feeling
vulnerable to felt rejection. Scheff and Retzinger (1991) continued this conceptualization of
shame and rejection’s similarities, hypothesizing they were synonymous to each other because
they shared a common threat of social isolation. While feelings of rejection have not been as
widely associated with shame as guilt, inferiority, or the other self-conscious emotions, many
works showed rejection to be central to one’s experience of shame (Baumeister & Leary, 1995;
Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Gausel and Leach (2011) strongly
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resisted the notion of feelings of rejection and shame to be synonymous as the former denoted a
state of being in opposition with another. While shame signaled one had violated a social or
cultural group norm, rejection was felt in combination with the sense that one has been
condemned by another and these two experiences directly led to self-defensive behaviors while
shame did not.
Shame-Proneness Versus
Situational Shame
In addition to discerning shame from other emotions, it is also imperative to understand
the difference between shame as it occurs over a long period of time versus a single isolated
incident. De Hooge (2014) not only recognized this difference but also provided a framework
from which to better understand this complex emotion through the terms situational shame and
shame-proneness. According to the author, shame-proneness is viewed more as a personality
characteristic as it reflects the general tendency of people to experience shame. Conversely,
situational shame denotes a single experience where this emotion is felt. Dempsey (2017) also
recognized this dichotomization of shame by illuminating these differences through the terms
state shame and trait shame. While state shame reflected De Hooge’s situational shame, trait
shame denoted a characteristic of one’s personality or shame-proneness. It is important to note
that shame-proneness and trait shame were also called dispositional shame in the literature
(Tignor & Colvin, 2017). Both Dempsey and de Hooge stressed that researchers could not equate
a person who experienced shame during a single situation (situational shame) with another
person who experienced a reoccurring and consistent pattern of shame (shame-proneness,
dispositional shame, or trait shame).
Studies that investigated the role of state shame as it compared to trait shame revealed
shame-proneness was reflective of the larger body of research demonstrating its problematic
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associations, while situational shame was positively related to temporary symptoms such as
situational feelings of anger, temporary anxiety, and momentary experiences of inferiority (Allan
et al., 1994; Rüsch, Corrigan et al., 2007). Allan et al. (1994) investigated the role of situational
shame without including items that measured behavioral avoidance and found state shame did
not correlate with other measures of psychopathology, depression, or social dysfunction.
Carvalho et al. (2015) found significant evidence that suggested shame did not necessarily lead
to aversive symptoms but rather to a pattern of cognitive avoidance that negatively impacted
symptoms such as traumatic memories and depression. Lee et al. (2001) similarly supported this
notion after finding cognitive avoidance with shame impeded one’s ability to emotionally
process traumatic events, which led to prolonged aversive symptoms of PTSD.
Issues with Measurement
It seemed plausible that the split in the literature regarding shame’s functionality might
come from the misperception of equating shame-proneness with situational shame. In reviewing
Tangney’s (1991) and Tangney et al.’s (1992) articles discussed above, which were foundational
in categorizing shame as a problematic emotion, it was evident these studies investigated the
effects of trait shame as opposed to state shame. The literature supporting shame’s problematic
functionality seemed to occur in far greater quantity than the functional viewpoint (Leach &
Cidam, 2015). Zabari (2016) offered a review of how the literature had best measured the selfconscious emotions and reported that shame was quantitatively measured through checklists or
scenario-based self-report scales. Of these methods, the most widely utilized approach by far was
the use of the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney & Dearing, 2002)—a
scenario-based self-report questionnaire that measures shame and guilt proneness.
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Some argued the misperception of shame’s functionality was largely due to the TOSCA3, which attributed prosocial behaviors to feeling guilty while withdraw behaviors were more
indicative of feeling ashamed (de Hooge, 2014; Dempsey, 2017; Ferguson & Crowley, 1997;
Gausel & Leach, 2011). The TOSCA-3 presents participants with four different options for how
they would respond to guilt and shame inducing situations. These options reflect a response
indicative of guilt, externalization, detachment, or shame. The authors have been criticized for
their limiting viewpoint of shame upon which the TOSCA-3 was built. For example, one of the
items said, “You made a mistake at work and find out that a coworker is blamed for the error.”
While the response that was supposed to be reflective of shame read, “You would keep quiet and
avoid the coworker,” which exhibits isolating behavior, the guilt response was “You would feel
unhappy and eager to correct the situation,” which was reflective of a prosocial behavior. Given
these options, shame was commonly found to be associated with problematic behaviors because
pro-social responses were scored as guilt.
If the most widely used shame-proneness instrument conceptually measures withdraw
behavior as opposed to shame-proneness, then this naturally raises questions as to how best to
operationalize one’s general tendency to experience shame. De Hooge (2014) emphasized that
since shame has demonstrated the potential to motivate prosocial behaviors, it is therefore crucial
for the literature to operationalize shame from the perspective that it can motivate both pursue
and withdrawal actions as opposed to simply categorizing it as an emotion reflective of isolation.
Indeed, Rüsch, Corrigna et al. (2007) evaluated the psychometric properties of shame-proneness
questionnaires and found significant discrepancies between the TOSCA-3 and other self-report
instruments. Moreover, the authors also found scenario-based measures, such as the TOSCA-3,
repeatedly demonstrated low internal consistency.
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De Hooge (2014) emphasized a hopeful measure to more holistically measuring shameproneness might be found with the Guilt and Shame Proneness scale (GASP; Cohen et al., 2011)
because it operationally differentiates between shame as a negative self-evaluation and as a
behavior; however, a closer look at the GASP indicated the shame and guilt subscales were
highly correlated with each other, thus limiting the measure’s discriminant validity. For example,
one of the items read, “Your home is very messy and unexpected guests knock on your door and
invite themselves in. What is the likelihood that you would avoid the guest until they leave?” It
seemed evident the participants might feel a combination of shame, guilt, or neither in response
to this hypothetical situation. Given the inadequacies of scenario-based measures of shameproneness, a more accurate assessment of shame-proneness can be found in the Experience of
Shame Scale (ESS; Andrews et al., 2002), which was used for the current study. I provide more
detail about the ESS in the next chapter; however, it was important to note this checklist
consistently demonstrated stronger internal consistency than the TOSCA-3, which naturally lent
itself to more accurately measuring shame-proneness.
Resolving the Debate
Leach and Cidam (2015) conducted a meta-analytic review of shame’s functionality and
found support for a neutral perspective of shame. These authors reviewed 90 samples from
published literature that included 12,364 participants and concluded that shame could motivate
approach and withdrawal behaviors, thus eliminating the need to categorize shame as functional
or problematic. An approach response was reflective of people engaging in a performanceorientated situation or undertaking reparative actions aimed at restoring one’s self-image, while
withdrawal behavior was indicative of people removing themselves from the situation and
protecting themselves from further failure or pain. It might seem efficient to categorize
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avoidance or approach responses as respectively problematic or functional; however, avoidance
responses seemed to have the potential to serve a functional purpose. For example, in the event
one receives especially lower-tier results on a standardized test such as the MCAT, it might be
functional to pursue a non-medical related degree. Additionally, it might also be beneficial for
one to not approach and make amends with social groups such as gangs, fraudulent business
corporations, or other groups that present potential danger to one’s survival.
Predicting a Prosocial Response
To summarize, the discrepancy in the literature came from a misunderstanding of
differentiating situational shame from shame-proneness as well as from other emotions, which
are reflected in erroneous conclusions drawn from measurement. While shame-proneness has
been more associated with psychopathology, it also seemed evident that shame’s functionality
could serve prosocial behaviors and, thus, was reflective of this emotion’s complexity as a
whole. The question in context was not so much whether shame is functional or dysfunctional
but rather what factors influenced people to choose a functional response (Cibich et al., 2016; de
Hooge et al., 2010, 2011). In their meta-analysis, Leach and Cidam (2015) found the strongest
moderator for predicting an adaptive response to a shame-inducing event was social competence.
Shame and Social Competence
Social competence, as defined by Bornstein et al. (2010), is used to describe one’s
interpersonal skills and encompasses the application of self-regulation, social cognition, positive
communication, and prosocial relationships. Throughout a series of seven experiments across
two separate articles, de Hooge et al. (2010, 2011) found that when one appraised the situation as
being too risky, participants were most likely to withdraw from the shame-inducing situation.
The first five experiments (de Hooge et al., 2010) found participants were less likely to approach
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a situation with the purpose of repairing it when they were told they did not have as much
influence in being able to positively impact the transgression in context. The current study tested
this finding by using de Hooge et al.’s (2010) fifth experiment as a framework for manipulating
social competence.
In the fifth experiment, de Hooge et al. (2010) randomly assigned 136 college students
into the conditions of a (Competency: low vs. high vs. no-information) between-subjects design
with the performance choice and willingness to perform and make amends for the competencebased transgression as the dependent variables. First, participants read, “Together with some
fellow students, you completed a group assignment. Every student is individually evaluated on
the part (s)he made.” Next, participants in the shame condition read, “At an earlier stage you
criticized the work of others, but in the end you are the only student in your group who failed the
exercise” while participants in the control condition read, “In the end every student in your group
passed the exercise.” Participants then engaged in a manipulation check where they rated how
much shame, pride, guilt, and fear they would feel in the described situation. Up until this point,
the authors largely replicated their previous experiments, which found results that indicated
people generally felt shame more than any other emotion and more often reported they would try
to repair the situation. However, in this specific experiment, the authors manipulated competence
by again separating participants from both the shame and control conditions into three (six total)
groups: no information, low competency, and high competency. The no-information group read,
“After the announcement of the grades, the lecturer informs you that there is an opportunity to do
another exercise. If you decide to do this exercise, your performance will be graded. Moreover,
the exercise will involve a lot of additional work” (de Hooge et al., 2010 p. 120).
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Participants in the low-competency condition read, “You have the feeling that you will
have little influence on the grade” while participants in the high-competency condition read,
“You have the feeling that you will have much influence on the grade.” Lastly, participants then
rated their willingness to perform and performance choice, which indicated that not only did the
researchers effectively manipulate shame but also competency moderated the relationship
between felt shame and a participant’s decision to engage in another exercise and thus repair the
situation.
De Hooge et al. (2008, 2010, 2011, 2018) found shame was linked with prosocial
behaviors across 13 different experiments. These results not only vastly changed the perception
of shame being an ugly emotion throughout the literature but also provided empirically validated
evidence in support for the moderator of competence. It was interesting to note these
experiments induced shame through three methods: autobiographical recall, collective “imagine
if” stories, and laboratory manipulation. Of these methods, all but autobiographical recall were
induced through a competence-based shame induction, which was theoretically different from
Gausel et al. (2012, 2016) who consistently induced shame through a moral-based transgression.
It seemed plausible to hypothesize that de Hooge et al. (2010, 2011) found competence to
moderate the relationship between shame and prosocial behaviors because it was a competencebased transgression. Recall that the primary difference between guilt and shame was guilt is
more reflective of feeling bad for the behaviors one has committed, while shame denotes a state
of feeling bad for the person one is. It seemed plausible to assume that doing poorly on a test or
presentation, such as the shame-induction methods from de Hooge et al. (2010, 2011), might be
more reflective of behavior and, thus, guilt than shame.
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Shame and Attachment
In addition to social competence, attachment also appeared to be an integral factor to how
one responds to shame given how one’s upbringing and environment shapes personality.
Tomkins (2008) was not the only person who theorized shame was an integral factor within the
parent-child relationship. Cook (1991) posited shame is rooted in the earliest of relationships
between infant and caregiver and emphasized that shame becomes triggered when the caregiver
is uninterested. According to Cook, shame is the central aspect to the infant-caregiver
relationship because shame is the reaction one feels to inattention. The author went on to stress
that when shame is felt in excess, it becomes a part of the self-structure, which heavily influences
how that individual navigates future relationships with peers. The ideas of Cook and Tomkins
closely paralleled Bowlby’s (1982) theory of attachment wherein a child develops either an
insecure or secure attachment style with their caregivers. As noted previously, the relationship is
defined as secure when the child develops an internal working model that feels safe in knowing
their caregiver will respond to their needs, whereas the converse of this environment defines
insecure attachment.
Lopez et al. (1997) investigated the relationship between shame and attachment style and
found insecure styles were more shame prone than their secure counterparts. These results were
reflective of the larger body of literature that linked shame-proneness with aversive parenting
behaviors (Gross & Hansen, 2000; Muris et al., 2014), negatively associated with parental
empathy (Ruckstaetter et al., 2017), authoritarian parenting style (Mills, 2003), abandonment
(Claesson & Sohlberg, 2002), conditional use of positive regard (Assor & Tal, 2012), and
parentification (Wells & Jones, 2000). While these findings did not seem surprising given the
literature already discussed on the connection between shame-proneness and psychopathology,
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the relationship between attachment and one’s perspective ability to repair a situation yielded
more positive associations. Benson et al. (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 53 studies and
12,482 participants on the relationship between attachment and social competence. Their results
indicated secure attachment style was associated with positive peer relationships and overall
social competence among adolescents. If one’s social competence is positively related to secure
attachment, then one might also conclude a prosocial response to a shaming situation might be
also associated with a positive parent-child relationship. The current study sought to better
understand this potential relationship as no study to date accurately assessed a prosocial response
to a situational shame inducing event and attachment styles.
The Gausel and Leach Model
The Gausel and Leach (2011) model (see Appendix A) does not categorize shame as
functional or dysfunctional but rather shame could motivate either social approach or selfdefensive behaviors. While this reframe is still vulnerable to a similar argument for
avoidance/withdrawal behaviors as self-defense could absolutely serve an adaptive or pro-social
function, Gausel and Leach termed self-defensive behaviors as representative of hostility, anger,
and aggression. This distinction came from a meta-analysis that found strong evidence to support
the association between felt rejection and anti-social behaviors (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). While
self-defensive behaviors could be functional, it seemed evident a general tendency to respond to
shameful experiences with self-defensive behaviors such as aggression or avoidance more often
leads to problematic than functional outcomes. The reason for this might be because avoiding the
shameful experience often leaves social rupture unresolved.
The Gausel and Leach (2011) model is primarily based on two specific appraisals and
three feelings that provide a pathway by which one is able to specify who and when a shame-
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inducing transgression leads to a specific response. As I have discussed, shame is an especially
broad emotion composed of a few salient elements. Gausel and Leach developed their model on
the foundation of these specific elements and how they related to form a predictable flow of
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Specifically, these authors viewed shame as a response to a
moral failure, which represents a violation of one’s behaviors or beliefs such as lying, cheating,
or stealing. More than an accidental transgression, moral failures represent an inability of one to
be honest, fair, or trustworthy (Gausel & Leach, 2011). According to this model, a moral failure
could be appraised in one of two ways. First, one perceives the situation as a concern for
“other’s” condemnation, while the second is the perception that one has a self-defect. Depending
on how the situation is appraised, a person feels ashamed, inferior, or rejected. Gausel and Leach
suggested that when one appraises the situation as self-defect, this is representative of a primary
concern for one’s self-image. However, when a person appraises the moral failure as a concern
for other’s condemnation, this reflects a concern for social-image. The authors did not postulate
that appraisals led to specific feelings or that feelings led to certain appraisals but rather
emphasized these appraisals and feelings worked in combination with one another to influence
behavior.
For example, let us say that someone has recently been chastised for lying to a friend.
That person could feel rejected, inferior, or ashamed of themselves for their transgression. If that
person feels rejected, this is representative of that person also being concerned with their social
image and, thus, appraises the situation as a concern for other’s condemnation. As a result of this
appraisal-feeling combination, that person is likely to act in self-defense (e.g., “I didn’t say
anything, they guessed the secret and were going to figure it out anyways”). Conversely, if the
person feels ashamed, they appraise the situation as a personal self-defect and are predominantly
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concerned for their self-image (e.g., “I thought if you believed me, you would like me more”).
As a result, one is likely to engage in social approach behaviors that attempt to repair the
situation with the purpose of restoring their view of self. This behavioral trajectory seems to
make sense given the appraisal-feeling combinations that either focused on self-image or socialimage but how then do feelings of inferiority factor into this model and what if this person, who
is caught in a lie, perceives the situation as unalterable? Recall that while shame reflects a state
of indignity, inferiority is representative of one feeling they have a defect that is unalterable.
Gausel and Leach (2011) proposed that when one appraises the situation as unalterable, they are
likely experiencing feelings of inferiority which, like rejection, also leads to self-defensive
behaviors because the situation is viewed as unrepairable.
Cibich et al. (2016) criticized this model for its myopic view of an otherwise complex
emotion: “Customizing the definition of shame can lead to a defining away of the complexity of
shame. After all, it is difficult to imagine guilt-free shame or an experience of shame with no
sense of inferiority” (p. 474). While this opinion that shame is felt in combination with other
emotions was also emphasized by Tomkins (2008), the Gausel and Leach (2011) model did not
deny this phenomenon but rather stressed that behaviors follow the most primary appraisalemotion experienced in that context. This model was built using Lazarus’s (1991) view that
emotions should be defined by their core relational themes instead of their everyday language
use. In other words, the concept of shame might be too broad and complex, which makes it
theoretically impossible to be consistently operationalized. Indeed, it seemed evident the review
of the literature discussed thus far reflected a general inconsistency to capture the construct of
shame and its functionality. From this perspective, it seemed no wonder that when Tangney and
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Dearing (2002) asked students to define and differentiate guilt and shame, they really could not
articulate any consistent clear differences.
The Gausel and Leach (2011) model has been empirically validated across four studies
that found strong evidence to support the two appraisals and three feelings were distinct
constructs that, in combination, consistently led to their respective behavioral responses (Gausel
et al., 2012, 2016). In the first set of two studies (Gausel et al., 2012), the authors assessed a
community’s appraisals and feelings toward a discriminated and often oppressed minority.
Through structural equation modeling, the authors found one’s concern of a self-defect best
predicted felt shame, while an appraisal of concern for other’s condemnation best predicted felt
rejection. The results indicated felt shame led to prosocial motivation and felt rejection led to
self-defensive motivation.
The second set of experiments (Gausel et al., 2016) extended the model’s ability to
predict behaviors with more precision. These authors, again, completed a factor analysis of
constructs and found similarly strong evidence to support appraisals and feelings as distinct from
each other. In their final experiment, these authors also utilized a collective “imagine if” story
where participants were asked to imagine themselves as the protagonist in the following excerpt:
You know a secret about one of your best friends. They just had to share it with you as it
was torturing them. The Information that they shared came as a total surprise to you and
you could never have imagined what you just heard. You promised not to let anyone
know as the secret was extremely personal. (Gausel et al., 2016, p. 128)
The current study largely replicated this experiment’s methodology in combination with the fifth
experiment from de Hooge et al. (2010). After reading this excerpt, 112 participants were then
randomly assigned into a one of three conditions: near moral failure, clear moral failure, and
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clear moral failure with risk to social-image. In the near moral failure condition, participants
almost told the secret to someone else but managed to keep the secret in the end; while in the
clear moral failure condition, participants told the secret but did not know the name of the friend
whose secret it was. This ensured the participants were “100% sure” their friend would not find
out they committed a moral transgression and, thus, effectively manipulated an experience where
the person’s self-image (as opposed to social image) was in jeopardy. In the third condition,
participants were told the person to whom they told the secret to was “100% sure” who the secret
was about and knew that person well, thus manipulating a threat to social image.
As a manipulation check, all participants indicated that keeping the secret was a serious
issue and correctly reported whether anyone could find out if the protagonist did or did not tell
the secret. Next, participants from all three conditions engaged in a series of items that
operationalized the following appraisals, feelings, and behavioral motivations: concern for
other’s condemnation, self-defect, shame, inferiority, rejection, prosocial motivation, and selfdefensive motivation (see key terms or the next chapter for specific prompts). The collective
results from Gausel et al. (2012, 2016) indicated a risk to social-image increased participants’
appraisal of concern for other’s condemnation by others, which predicted greater felt rejection
and self-defensive motivation. The more participants were concerned with the perceptions others
had of them (social image), the more they were likely to feel rejected and wanting to engage in
self-defensive responses. Conversely, felt shame significantly predicted a desire to repair the
moral transgression. These studies provided substantially strong evidence to support the need to
differentiate shame from other emotions and that a concern for self or social image could predict
a behavioral response. The current study used the framework from Gausel et al. (2016) to induce
shame with the same induction method of telling a friend’s personal secret and using the same
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items to measure the appraisals, feelings, and behavioral motivations. Additionally, the current
study also utilized de Hooge et al.’s (2010) competency manipulation methodology of the three
competency conditions. In so doing, this study strengthened the predictive validity of the Gausel
and Leach (2011) model by integrating it with the most empirically supported moderator today—
social competence (Leach & Cidam, 2015).
Summary and Rationale
Shame has been widely associated with a myriad of aversive symptomology (for a
review, see Tignor & Colvin, 2017) However, while some sought to conceptualize shame as an
ugly emotion that is reflective of an intense belief in thinking one is flawed, undesirable, and/or
defective (Tangney, 1991), others demonstrated empirical evidence in support of shame serving
a functional purpose in motivating prosocial behaviors (de Hooge et al., 2008, 2010, 2011, 2018;
Gausel et al., 2012, 2016). This study sought to add to the literature in a number of ways but first
and foremost, its purpose was to add to our conceptualization of shame. Right now, the current
state of the literature leans heavily toward a perspective of shame that is maladaptive and a key
factor strongly associated with psychopathology. While this study did not deny the
uncomfortable nature and potentially debilitating effects of shame, it sought to add critical
understanding to an emotion so central to human functioning.
This study did not only utilize Tomkins’s (2008) affect theory as a framework, but also
the Gausel and Leach (2011) model as well. These two foundations provided direction toward a
study that was not limited by the misperceptions of shame as it is related to other constructs such
as guilt, inferiority, rejection, or shame-proneness. In addition to these two frameworks (Gausel
& Leach, 2011; Tomkins, 2008), I was heavily reliant on the direction provided by de Hooge
(2014) and de Hooge et al. (2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2018) who provided over a dozen

51
experiments that offered concrete, empirical evidence of shame’s prosocial functionality. In the
last of these experiments, de Hooge et al. (2018) made a call to research to investigate the
relationship between shame-proneness and prosocial behaviors given the reconceptualization of
shame that appeared in the literature. Using the Gausel and Leach model, I answered this call by
testing for associations between those who chose prosocial or self-defensive motivation
following a moral transgression. Understanding how shame-proneness relates to the sample’s
reported motivations to engage in prosocial or self-defensive behaviors added to the literature’s
differentiation of state versus trait shame. Additionally, testing for associations of shameproneness also provided information regarding shame’s functionality. For example, it was
interesting to see if those with higher shame-proneness scores gravitated toward self-defensive or
prosocial behavioral motivation and testing for associations with the five feelings and appraisals
provided evidence as to why.
Investigating these associations provided further evidence of shame’s versatile
functionality and better understanding for researchers, practitioners, and clients alike to manage
the powerful and potentially harmful effects of shame. In so doing, this study also focused on
Tomkins (2008) and Cook (1991) who strongly emphasized the role of attachment in forming
how one responded to shame. To date, the literature on attachment focused almost exclusively on
shame-proneness; however, no studies applied the Gausel and Leach (2011) model nor the
findings of de Hooge (2014) and de Hooge et al. (2008, 2010, 2011, 2018) to the study of
attachment.
In addition, this study advanced the current perspective of shame by specifically testing
social competence with a moral transgression. The work of de Hooge et al. (2008, 2010, 2011,
2018) heavily relied on competence-based transgression, which seemingly provided some
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plausibility to assume competence only moderated the relationship between shame and prosocial
behaviors when it was a competence-based transgression. Gausel et al. (2016) offered evidence
of a causal pathway between shame and prosocial behavior following a moral transgression;
thus, this study largely replicated their methodology to test de Hooge’s et al. (2010, 2011)
findings of the role competence had in moderating a shame response. In deepening our
conceptualization of shame and its applied functionality in human behavior, this study added to
our understanding of how shame impacted a person’s decision to choose whether to approach or
withdraw from a transgression. These findings not only helped us interpret behavior following a
moral transgression, but also expanded the literature’s ability to predict who, when, and why
people chose to make reparations while others did not. Regardless of the significant results, the
findings gleaned from this study either supported an old conceptualization of shame
(dysfunctional), new conceptualization of shame (functional), or a combination of both, yielding
imperative conclusions and implications for future research.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of the current study was twofold: the first objective was to add to the
literature on how shame is conceptualized while the second goal was to expand our
understanding of how shame impacts behavior motivation. This chapter provides an overview of
the research methodology by specifically examining whether shame influenced prosocial
behaviors following a moral transgression, to what degree social competence moderated the
relationship between felt shame and prosocial behavior, and how shame-proneness and
attachment styles were associated with the factors identified within this process. This chapter
outlines the design for this study by first describing participant characteristics, instrumentation,
and procedures. I then identify hypotheses and explain data analysis procedures used to answer
the research questions.
Research Design
The current study sought to explain whether a person would report behavioral motivation
to make reparations for a moral transgression and whether social competence moderated the
relationship to approach or withdraw. A posttest-only control group experimental design was
utilized to accomplish these objectives, which specifically paralleled the designs of some of the
most prominent research studies on shame’s prosocial functionality (de Hooge et al., 2008, 2010,
2011, 2018; Gausel et al., 2012, 2016). Following a review of these salient works, it was evident
that shame had the potential to influence both prosocial and self-defensive behaviors and the
Gausel and Leach (2011) model provided a pathway via its feeling-appraisal combinations from
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which to predict who and when a person chose to engage in prosocial or self-defensive behaviors
(see Appendix A). Combining this model with the results from de Hooge et al. (2010) and testing
for associations with shame-proneness and attachment provided critical information that added to
the validity of this model and a foundation to better understanding “why” this process happened.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups that specifically focused on
inducing a self-defect, felt shame feeling-appraisal combination and then presented participants
with one of three conditions that manipulated their social competence (competency: low vs. high
vs. no-information). In essence, the current study exposed participants to a situation that invoked
shame and manipulated the moderating variable of competence to see what effect it had over
their decision to engage in either prosocial or self-defensive behavioral motivation (see
Appendix B for a chart that outlined the study’s design). Using a cross-sectional case-controlled
design, the current study then examined the relationships between those who indicated they
would engage in prosocial behaviors versus those who reported self-defensive behaviors across
shame-proneness and parental attachment scales. These two constructs were used to understand
specific characteristics of those who chose to engage in prosocial behaviors (make reparations)
versus those who reported self-defensive behavioral motivation.
Participants
Volunteer participants (n=131) were recruited from psychology, sociology, and
University 101 population pools from a public Rocky Mountain university using convenience
sampling and a Qualtrics survey. This target population of college students was also utilized by
de Hooge et al. (2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2018) and a substantial amount of other prominent
studies on shame’s functionality providing evidence to suggest this population was capable of
providing generalizable results on a universal human emotion such as shame (Hoglund &
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Nicholas, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 1992). While this study collected data
from only one university, the use of random assignment ensured most differences between and
within the groups could be attributed to the experiment and not to other effects. According to this
specific university’s 2019 spring enrollment profile, the university wherein participants were
recruited contained 8,854 undergraduate and 3,095 graduate students wherein 3,291 (27.5%)
identified as a minority, thus rendering a sampling pool capable of providing results reflective of
participants from diverse backgrounds.
Instrumentation
Demographic Questionnaire
The demographic questionnaire (see Appendix C) consisted of nine items that provided a
survey of the participant’s identity and family of origin. The questionnaire asked participants to
identify their gender, age, race, ethnicity, current year of college, country of origin, present living
situation, and whether the family of origin was intact or not (divorced, separated, deceased, or
other). Following Hyde et al.’s (2019) recommendations for inclusive research that catered to
participants identifying outside of the gender binary, this study provided the following options
for gender: female, male, transgender female, transgender male, genderqueer, and other
(specify). Other questions specific to this study pertained to culture and state of the participant’s
family of origin. These specific questions were based on a similar study that investigated the role
of attachment and the functional characteristics of perfectionism (Romano, 2009). Collecting
more specific information on one’s culture and family of origin provided additional meaning for
the results gleaned from this study. All variables were scored on a categorical basis with age
being the only variable on a continuum.
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The Experience of Shame Scale
The Experience of Shame Scale (ESS) as developed by Andrews et al. (2002) is a
checklist that assesses shame-proneness across experiential, cognitive, and behavioral domains
(see Appendix D). This questionnaire contains 25 Likert-type items where participants responded
according to how they have felt over the past year on a 4-point scale ranging from 1—Not at all
to 4—Very much. Higher scores reflected a greater intensity of shame-proneness. A total score
was computed from the three subscale scores and the total score can range between 25 to 100. As
mentioned in the literature review, Zabari (2016) reported that shame-proneness is
predominantly measured by checklists or scenario-based measures. Each has its advantages and
disadvantageous. While I reviewed issues with internal consistency and scenario-based measures
like the TOSCA-3 (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) and GASP (Cohen et al., 2011), the ESS was not
free of such methodological problems. For example, the ESS unfortunately used the terms
“shame” and “ashamed” within their items, which had the potential to confuse participants from
responding as accurately as they would to scenario-based items that did not include those terms
(Zabari, 2016). This seemed like a relevant concern given Tangney and Dearing’s (2002) results
effectively concluding that college students frequently failed to differentiate between guilt and
shame.
Nonetheless, the ESS produced high internal consistency across a sample of 163 college
students for its total scale score with a Cronbach’s alpha of .92 (Andrews et al., 2002). In the
same study, the ESS also produced internal consistencies for its three subscales of .90, .87, and
86 (Cronbach’s alpha) and test-retest reliabilities for an 11-week interval were .78, .74, and .82.
Andrews et al. (2002) also compared convergent and discriminant validity with the TOSCA-3
and found the following correlations for the ESS’s total scale score: TOSCA-3 shame (.61),
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TOSCA-3 guilt (.23). For this sample, the Cronbach alphas were as follows: .94 (total score), .91
(characterological shame), .89 (behavioral shame), and .87 (bodily shame).
Vizin et al. (2016) explored the construct validity of the ESS with clinical and nonclinical samples and found that across 382 participants, a confirmatory factor analysis yielded
good model fit (χ2=683.7, df=251, CFI=0.978, TLI=0.973, RMSEA=0.077). Additionally, these
authors also found strong Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the three subscales and total scale
score as well, which ranged from .87 to .94. Additionally, these authors also conducted test-retest
reliability over an interval of two weeks and found the three subscales yielded .84, .85, and .92
correlations. For the current study, the ESS’s total scale score was used to provide an indication
of how shame-proneness was related to those who reported they would make reparations
following a moral transgression and those who marked they would not.
Inventory of Parent and Peer
Attachment
As developed by Armsden and Greenberg (1987), the Inventory of Parent and Peer
Attachment (IPPA; see Appendix E) was based on Bowlby’s (1982) attachment theory and was
developed to assess a person’s current perceptions of the positive and negative
affective/cognitive dimensions of relationships with their parents and close friends. The IPPA
asked participants to indicate how true each statement was for them on a 5-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 1—Almost never or never true to 5—Almost always or always true. This
measure had the potential to assess a participant’s relationship to their father, mother, and peers
to yield a combined parent score and individual peer score. Given the high frequency of oneparent households, participants in this study were asked to speak to whichever caregiver was
most influential to them. Additionally, the peer attachment portion of this measure was not used,
which paralleled the majority in its use (Andretta et al., 2017). The IPPA measured overall
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security of attachment through the following three subscales: Alienation (8 items), Trust (10
items, and Communication (10 items). A summary score was computed by summing the Trust
and Communication raw scores and subtracting the Alienation raw score. Higher scores reflected
stronger secure attachment within the parent-child relationship, while lower scores indicated less
secure attachment. The IPPA was used similarly to the ESS for the current study as a dependent
variable for the Gausel and Leach (2011) model factors.
Armsden and Greenberg (1987) conducted internal consistency reliability and test-retest
reliability analyses on a sample of 27 participants ranging from 18 to 20 years of age. The
authors found reliability coefficients of .93 for test-retest reliability over an interval of three
weeks and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .86 for scores on Alienation, .91 for scores on Trust,
and .91 for scores on Communication. Moreover, these authors also found Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients of .87 for scores on Mother Attachment and .89 for scores on Father Attachment. For
this sample, the Cronbach alphas for the total mother and father scores were .97 and .95,
respectively. With regard to the subscales, the mother Cronbach alphas were .938 (Trust), .924
(Communication), and .854 (Alienation). For those who indicated their father was the most
influential caregiver, the Cronbach alphas were .893 (Trust), .884 (Communication), and .896
(Alienation).
Additionally, Armsden and Greenberg (1987) sampled 86 participants and found strong
convergent validity with the family Environment Scale (Moos & Moos, 1986; r = .52, p < .001
and r = .38, p < .001) and the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (Fitts, 1965; r = .78). Reese et al.
(2002) conducted a reliability generalization study of five of the most prominent adult
attachment style measures (n of studies = 25) and found the IPPA subscales of Trust and
Communication scales had high mean score reliability estimates with coefficients close or equal
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to .90,with little variability among studies. Alienation showed more variability but still
demonstrated a mean score reliability estimate of .81. With regard to validity, Armsden and
Greenberg found convergent validity scores correlated with measures of self-concept, selfesteem, life satisfaction, problem solving, and locus of control. Andretta et al. (2017) conducted
a confirmatory factor analysis that substantiated the three-factor structure for parent but not for
peer scores (RMSEA=.04, CFI=.95). Additionally, these authors also found significant
convergent validity as scores on the IPPA correlated with scores of self-esteem and self-efficacy
(0.48 ≤ Cohen's d ≤ 1.67).
The Gausel and Leach Model
Gausel and Leach (2011) constructed their model with the purpose of predicting who and
when one would choose to engage in prosocial or self-defensive behavior following a moral
transgression. The model as outlined above was tested in two different studies across four
different experiments producing results representative of 576 participants (Gausel et al., 2012,
2016). The authors of these studies conducted confirmatory factor analyses that yielded
psychometrically sound results for a five-factor structure (study 1= χ2=162.71, p < .001,
CFI=0.962, IFI=0.963, RMSEA=0.072; study 2= χ2=167.09, p < .001, CFI=0.928,
SRMR=0.056). The Gausel and Leach (2011) model was used to test the predictive pathways
found during these two studies and to further assess how shame-proneness and parental
attachment were associated with the feelings (inferiority and rejection), appraisals (other
condemnation and self-defect), and behavioral motivations (prosocial and self-defensive; Gausel
et al., 2016). Table 3.1 shows the breakdown of items and their specific prompts for each of the
seven constructs. Each item required participants to rate on a 7-point intensity scale that ranged
from 1—Not at all to 7—Very much. The authors of the Gausel and Leach model did not report
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any internal consistency data; however, this study found the following Cronbach alphas: .92
(Shame), .87 (Rejection), .64 (Inferiority), .94 (Other Condemnation), .82 (Self-defect), .90
(Prosocial), and .66 (Self-defensive).

Table 3.1
The Gausel and Leach Model Items
Feelings

Appraisals

Behavioral
Motivation

Items
Inferiority

Responses
1. I feel inferior to others reflecting on what happened
2. I feel vulnerable thinking about what happened

Shame

1.
2.
3.

I feel disgraced about this
I feel ashamed thinking about what I had done
I feel humiliated reflecting on this

Rejection

1.
2.
3.

I feel rejected thinking about what happened
I feel alone thinking about what happened
I feel rebuffed thinking about what happened

Other
Condemnation

1.
2.
3.

Others might not have the same respect for me because of this
I can be rejected by others because of what I have done
I think I can be isolated from others because of this

Self-Defect

1.
2.

I think I am defective in some way
I think this episode expresses a moral failure in me

Prosocial

1.

I would try to repair some of the damage I have caused my
friend
I would feel I should compensate my friend for what has
happened
I feel I should compensate my friend (e.g. offer emotional
support)
If I could I would like to tell my friend how sorry I feel
It would be important that my friend knew that I felt bad about
this
I would like to express my concerns to my friend”

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Self-Defensive

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

If I could, I would like to avoid meeting people who know
what I did
I would rather not get mixed in discussions about what I did
I would not mind talking about what I did (reverse score)
If I met my friend, I would think of something else than what I
did
I would like to forget about what I did and everything that
happened
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Procedures
Before collecting data, the current study obtained Institutional Review Board approval
from the host university (see Appendix F). The current study recruited both graduate and
undergraduate students from a Rocky Mountain university who were at least 18 years of age.
Outreach efforts were conducted over psychology department specific listservs. These online
presentations and outreach emails mirrored content found in the Informed Consent (see
Appendix G), which asked participants to complete a series of questions found through a
Qualtrics link that would last roughly 15 minutes in duration. All participants were informed the
purpose of the study was to investigate a college student’s relationship with caregivers and their
experiences with shame. Extra credit was offered as an incentive if the professor of that class
allowed it.
In maintaining participant confidentially and safety, the informed consent form was used
to ensure participation was voluntary and would in no way influence their grade in the course.
Given that participants completed the questionnaire anonymously, the consent form read that
completion of the survey implied consent. Moreover, participants were assigned random number
codes that were used to link demographics with their results. Participants’ information and
number codes were kept on an encrypted flash drive that was stored in a locked file drawer. In
accordance with state law, data and informed consent information will be kept for three years.
With regard to sample size, G*Power was used to determine the minimum number of
participants needed to find significance in the study. Following Cohen’s (1992) power analysis
guidelines, this study used an alpha of .05, a power level of .80, and a small effect size of 0.10,
which yielded a minimum of 80 participants needed for the current study. Since de Hooge et al.
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(2010, 2016) recruited 112 and 136 participants, respectively, this study sought to go above and
beyond the minimum standards for sample size and recruited closer to 120 participants.
Once consent was obtained, participants completed an online Qualtrics survey that began
with the demographic questionnaire (11 items; see Appendix C). The current study used a
collective “imagine if” story as a shame induction method and randomly assigned participants
into the conditions of a 2 (Emotion condition: near-shame vs. clear-shame) x 3 (Competency:
low vs. high vs. no-information) between subjects design with behavior motivation (selfdefensive and prosocial) serving as a dependent variable (see Appendix B). The following
prompt was given to all participants at the beginning of the Qualtrics survey:
You know a secret about one of your best friends. They just had to share it with you as it
was torturing them. The information that they shared came as a total surprise to you and
you could never have imagined what you just heard. You promised not to let anyone
know as the secret was extremely personal. (Gausel et al., 2016, p. 128)
Next, participants were randomized into the near-shame or clear-shame conditions, which were
differentiated by the presence of a moral transgression. In the near-shame condition, participants
read they “almost told the secret to someone else but managed to keep the secret in the end”
(Gausel et al., 2016 p. 128). In the clear-shame condition, participants read they told the secret to
someone else but they were “100% sure the other person would not tell their friend because they
were unaware of who the secret was about” (Gausel et al., 2016 p. 128).
These prompts were specifically selected because they presented participants with a
situation where they (hypothetically) committed a moral transgression that did not pose a threat
to their social image as much it did their self-image. Since telling someone’s secret was a
violation of one’s honesty and trustworthiness, this hypothetical situation provided a realistic
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example of a moral transgression (for a review, see Leach et al., 2015). Recall that those who
perceived a threat to their social-image were more than likely to also engage in a rejection/othercondemnation feeling-appraisal which led to self-defensive behavior (Gausel & Leach, 2011).
By presenting participants with a moral transgression where they were the predominant person
who was aware of the act induced a transgression that threatened the view they had about
themselves.
Participants from both conditions were then presented with the Gausel and Leach (2011)
model’s feeling and appraisal items as well as an item that asked each person to indicate
(correctly) whether anyone could find out if the protagonist did or did not tell the secret to ensure
they understood the situation (Gausel et al., 2016). By presenting the sample with these items (14
total), I was able to effectively measure that a feeling-appraisal combination of shame and selfdefect was being manipulated. Every step until this point directly mirrored Gausel et al.’s (2016)
methodology except this study did not contain a third group that sought to test the predictive
pathway of a risk to social image. I then began to follow de Hooge et al.’s (2010) design that
effectively manipulated the variable of social competence. Participants in both the near-shame
and clear-shame conditions then read: “After your conversation with the other person, you have
the opportunity to discuss what happened with the friend that confided in you. If you decide to
talk to this friend, your actions carry the potential for your friend to become angry with you.”
Participants in the no-information condition were administered the Gausel and Leach
(2011) model’s behavioral motivation items. The other participants were separated into two
additional conditions: the low-competence condition or the high-competence condition.
Participants in the low-competence condition read, “You have the feeling that you will have little
influence in repairing this situation with your friend” while participants in the high-competence
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condition read, “You have the feeling that you will have a lot of influence in repairing this
situation with your friend.” These competency prompts, although different due to a moral
transgression induction method, strongly resembled de Hooge et al.’s (2010) fifth experiment
methodology. Participants were then administered the 11 Gausel and Leach (2011) model’s
behavioral motivation items that effectively assessed whether the participant preferred to engage
in prosocial or self-defensive behavior. Lastly, participants then completed the ESS and IPPA in
that order. After the Qualtrics survey was completed, participants received a confirmatory email
validating their participation for extra credit.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The following research questions were designed to examine differences among
attachment, shame-proneness, social competence and the Gausel and Leach (2011) model’s
appraisals (condemnation and self-defect) and feelings (shame and rejection) with prosocial and
self-defensive motivations.
Q1

Are the Gausel and Leach Model relationships reflected in the model?

Specifically, are there high correlations between the prosocial (appraisal: “self-defect,”
feeling: “shame,” behavioral motivation: “prosocial”) and self defensive pathways (appraisal:
“other condemnation,” feeling: “rejection,” behavioral motivation: “self-defense”)?
H1

Based on the predictive pathways found by Gausel et al. (2016), it is hypothesized
the prosocial and self-defensive pathways will be negatively correlated, while the
feeling, appraisal, and behavior motivation domains will be individually,
positively correlated with each other.

Specifically, self-defect, shame, and prosocial motivation should be highly correlated
with each other and negatively correlated with other condemnation, rejection, and self-defensive
motivation.
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Q2

Are there differences in behavioral motivation between the clear-shame and nearshame group?

H2

Based on the research that emphasized shame’s prosocial functionality (de Hooge
et al., 2010, 2011; Gausel et al., 2016), it is hypothesized the clear-shame group
will have higher scores of prosocial behavior motivation. It is also hypothesized,
that since I did not invoke rejection, there would also not be a significant
difference between groups on self-defensive motivation.

Q3

Is there a significant interaction effect between the shame groups and the three
levels of competence (no-information, low competence, and high competence) on
prosocial and self-defensive motivation?

H3

In light of the findings from de Hooge et al. (2010, 2011), it is hypothesized that
the more competence perceived will yield higher mean scores of prosocial
motivation.

Specifically, the high competence group should demonstrate the highest mean scores of
prosocial motivation while the low competence group will provide the lowest scores of prosocial
motivation. Given the results of Gausel et al. (2016) and de Hooge et al. (2010), I hypothesized
prosocial motivation scores were likely to significantly differ by an interaction of competence
and shame scores. Conversely, I also hypothesized the self-defensive motivation scores were
likely to significantly differ by an interaction of competence and rejection scores.
Q4

Are higher parent scores of the IPPA associated with (A) self-defect, (B) shame,
and (C) prosocial motivation from the Gausel and Leach Model?

H4

Following the results of Meesters et al. (2017), it was hypothesized that regardless
of the near-shame or clear-shame conditions, higher parent scores from both
groups of the IPPA would be significantly associated with the (A) self-defect
appraisal, (B) shame, and (C) prosocial behavioral motivation.

Q5

Are higher parent scores of the ESS associated with (A) other condemnation, (B)
rejection, and (C) self-defensive domains from the Gausel and Leach Model?

H5

Given that shame-proneness has been positively associated with aversive
symptomology and negative behavioral outcomes (for a review, see Dempsey,
2017), it was hypothesized that regardless of group, higher scores on the ESS
would be significantly associated with higher scores on (A) other condemnation,
(B) rejection, and (C) self-defensive motivation.
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Table 3.2 provides the specific identification of variables that existed for each research
question.

Table 3.2
Research Questions and Variables
Research Question
Q1

Independent Variable(s)

Dependent Variable(s)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Condemnation
Self-defect
Inferiority
Rejection
Shame
Prosocial
Self-defensive

Q2 & 3

•
•
•
•
•

Clear Shame
Near Shame
No Information
Low Competency
High Competency

•
•

Prosocial motivation
Self-defensive
motivation

Q4

•
•
•

Self-defect
Shame
Prosocial

•

IPPA parent score

Q5

•
•

Condemnation
Rejection
• Self-defensive

• ESS total score

Data Analysis
Once all of the data were collected from Qualtrics, IBM’s Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 26 was used to conduct preliminary and primary analyses. In
cases where participants did not answer at least 90% of the questions on a measure in the survey,
that survey was removed from data analysis and documented as such. First and foremost, I
analyzed descriptive statistics before interpreting any results. Specifically, I examined the means,
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standard deviations, skew, kurtosis, and outliers in the data. Frequencies were also examined
with the purpose of familiarizing myself with the data with specific regard to distributions of
item responses across the measures used for the study. For example, Gausel et al.’s (2016)
preliminary analyses revealed a marginal difference in the gender ratio across conditions so the
authors had to control for the effects of gender in the model. While the first research question
was answered through a descriptive correlations table, the second and third questions were
answered through a two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and the fourth and
fifth research questions were answered by two separate multiple regressions.
With regard to the first set of questions (Questions 2 and 3), a two-way MANOVA was
used to understand whether there were significant differences between the clear and near-shame
groups on prosocial and self-defensive behavioral motivation. These questions were tested to see
if this dataset found similar results to other studies that found shame to be an integral component
to motivating prosocial behaviors. According to Pituch and Stevens (2016), who specifically
discussed how to utilize MANOVA analyses for the social sciences, the data must not contain
univariate or multivariate outliers, must have multivariate normality, no multicollinearity, linear
relationship between dependent variables and each group of independent variables, homogeneity
of variance-covariance matrices, and homogeneity of variances. Univariate and multivariate
outliers were respectively tested by a boxplot for values greater than 1.5 box-lengths from the
edge of the box and Mahalanobis distance. Normality was checked by using a Shapiro-Wilk test.
Multicollinearity was tested by running a bivariate procedure using Pearson correlations and
linearity was assessed using a split file procedure and scatterplot matrix. The equality of
variance-covariance was analyzed via the Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices and
homogeneity of variance was tested using Levene’s test of equality of error variance. Once
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assumptions were tested, I then analyzed descriptive statistics, assessed Wilks’ Lambda to see
significant differences between groups, and then looked at the tests of between-subjects effects to
better understand prosocial and self-defensive behavioral motivation’s specific contributions to
the model.
As for the latter half of the study, Research Questions 4 and 5 were answered using two
separate, standard multiple regression analyses. This study sought to test the impact of the
Gausel and Leach (2011) model’s feelings, appraisals, and behavioral motivation constructs
across parental attachment and shame-proneness. According to Gelman and Hill (2007), multiple
regression allows the researcher to understand the proportion of the variability in the dependent
variable that is explained by its relationship with the independent variables as well as their
relative contributions. The overall fit of the model was evaluated using an F-test. The model fit
was also inspected using the ", "! , and adjusted "! . The estimated model coefficients were
tested to understand how much the IPPA and ESS varied with the Gausel and Leach model
domains. Assumptions for a multiple regression were as follows: independence of observations,
linear relationship between independent and dependent variables, homoscedasticity of residuals,
no multicollinearity, errors should be normally distributed, and there should be no significant
outliers or high leverage points. With regard to independence of observations, first-order
autocorrelation was analyzed using the Durbin-Watson statistic. Next, linearity between
variables was assessed using a scatterplot of studentized residuals and partial regression plots of
each independent variable. Homoscedasticity and multicollinearity were respectively tested by
plotting studentized residuals against unstandardized predicted values and inspecting correlation
coefficients and tolerance/VIF values. Outliers were detected using casewise diagnostics and
normal distribution of residuals was tested using a histogram and P-P Plots.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This study explored the functionality of shame by specifically investigating if and when
shame motivated a prosocial or self-defensive behavioral response and social competence’s
potential moderating relationship between these variables. Additionally, shame-proneness and
parental attachment constructs were also investigated in specific relation to a situational
experience of shame. The purpose of this chapter is to report the results of this study. To
accomplish this task, an overview of the study’s procedures is provided first. Then I discuss the
demographics, preliminary analyses, and assumptions. Lastly, this chapter concludes with the
results from the study in specific relation to the research questions previously posed in the
preceding chapters.
Overview
Participants were recruited online through university specific listservs and the
institution’s SONA system, which is a cloud-based participant management system used
primarily as a recruitment pool for students in introductory psychology courses and first year
experience programs. All participants were given an informed consent document (see Appendix
G) and participated in a survey that randomly assigned them into a “clear-shame” or “nearshame” group that differed by the collective “Imagine if…” story provided. All participants read
that they were told a highly personal secret from a good friend: those in the near-shame group
“nearly” told the secret while those in the clear-shame group did tell the secret. Participants were
then randomly assigned to one of three groups that varied in level of social competence. Those in
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the “high-competence” group were told they would have “a lot of influence” to positively impact
the situation, while those in the “low-competence” group were told they would have “little
influence” in repairing the situation. The third competency-based group was titled “noinformation” because participants were not given any information about their ability to change or
repair their hypothetical wrongdoing.
All respondents participated in a manipulation check to ensure they understood the
situation they were in and were also given the Gausel and Leach (2011) model items to assess
their feeling-appraisal combinations (appraisals: other condemnation and self-defect; feelings:
shame, inferiority, and rejection). Lastly, participants were administered the Experience of
Shame Scale (ESS) and Inventory of Parental and Peer Attachment (IPPA) to respectively assess
shame-proneness and attachment with caregivers. Assessing attachment, and shame-proneness
when it differentiated from a situational experience of shame, provided context in understanding
why participants made the choices they did. As noted in the previous chapter, only the parent
attachment scores of the IPPA were used and not the peer attachment portion. This paralleled the
majority the IPPA’s use (Andretta et al., 2017).
Demographics
The sample consisted of 131 participants that ranged from ages 18 to 51 with the majority
being between the ages of 18 and 21 (48.9%). Most of the sample identified as female (72.5%)
compared to their male (22.1%), transgender male (1.5%), genderqueer (2.3%), and other (1.5%)
counterparts. Additionally, most of the sample identified as White (88.5%) with Black or African
American (3.8%), American Indian or Alaska Native (1.5%), Asian (2.3%), and Native Hawaiian
or Other Pacific Islander (1.5%) also engaging in the study. These descriptive statistics strongly
resembled other college populations in the United States; however, 9.2% of participants reported
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they were born outside of the United States and 16% stated their parents were not born in the
United States. Among the many places of origin, Bulgaria, China, Eritrea Asmara, Germany,
Laos, India, and Mexico were but a few of the responses. Additionally, 61.8% reported they had
been raised in a “Intact” family, meaning they grew up with both parents in the household, while
other participants reported being raised by a single parent (6.1%), divorced parent (21.4%),
deceased parent (4.6%), and other (6.1%). Exactly 58% of the participants identified as
undergraduates while 42% reported being in graduate school.
Preliminary Analysis
Of the 160 total responses for the online survey, 29 did not complete at least 90% of it.
One participant informed the researcher they were not able to move backward on the survey,
which caused them to exit and restart. This might explain the seemingly high number of
participant responses that did not meet the cutoff completion rate. Since the survey was
structured with an experimental design, participants were not able to go back and change
answers because the questions posed to them were based on their previous responses. For
example, participants could not read the “clear shame” group’s prompts and then go “backward”
and risk possibly reading the “near shame” group’s hypothetical situation as the intent of the
study was to assess for between group differences. Additionally, no participant responses
mirrored a pattern of answers that would indicate disingenuous responses (answering with all
“1”s or other sequences) and the majority of respondents spent at least four minutes completing
the survey with the average being slightly less than 10 minutes. The total number of participants
for the study was 131, which not only matched other prominent sample sizes for this topic and
overall design but also exceeded the intended sample size of at least 120 participants as
determined by a power analysis reported in the previous chapter.
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Findings
Research Question 1
Q1

Are the Gausel and Leach Model relationships reflected in the model?

It was also hypothesized that the prosocial and self-defensive pathways would be
negatively correlated, while the feeling, appraisal, and behavior motivation domains would be
individually, positively correlated with each other. In essence, it was hypothesized that
correlations between constructs would parallel the pathways visualized in Gausel and Leach’s
(2011) model (see Appendix A).
This hypothesis was partially supported as Shame was positively correlated with SelfDefect (.756) but was not significantly correlated with Self-Improve (Prosocial Motivation)
(.342). With regard to the self-defense pathway (upper half of diagram), Rejection and Other
Condemnation were positively correlated (.577); however, there was no significant relationship
with Self-Defensive Motivation (.36). As is discussed in more detail below regarding
multicollinearity, it is important to note there were high correlations for all feelings and
appraisals but not behavioral motivations (see Table 4.1). For example, not only was shame/selfdefect highly correlated, which paralleled the Gausel and Leach (2011) model, but contrary to
that pathway, Shame was also highly correlated with Rejection (.721) and Other Condemnation
(.776).
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Table 4.1
Pearson Correlation Statistics Between Variables
SelfDefect

Other
Condemnation

Shame

Rejection

Prosocial

1

.739**

.756**

.664**

.258**

SelfDefensive
Motivation
.429**

Other
Condemnation

.739**

1

.776**

.577**

.331**

.431**

Shame

.756**

.776**

1

.721**

.342**

.367**

Rejection

.664**

.577**

.721**

1

.203*

.360**

Prosocial
Motivation

.258**

.331**

342**

.203*

1

.290**

Self-Defensive
Motivation

.429**

.431**

.367**

.360**

.290**

1

Gausel and
Leach Model
Self-Defect

Pearson r correlation is significant at the .01 (2-tailed)*
Pearson r correlation is significant at the 0.5 level (2-tailed)**
Research Questions 2 and 3
Q2

Are there differences in behavioral motivation between the clear-shame and nearshame groups?

It was also hypothesized that the clear-shame group would have higher scores of
prosocial behavior motivation. This hypothesis was not supported as there was no statistically
significant main effect on shame groups with prosocial and self-defensive behavior motivation,
F(2, 124) = 0.1.758, p = .177, Wilks' Λ = .972, partial η2 = .028. In other words, the shame
condition in this experiment did not significantly impact a participant’s decision to report higher
levels of prosocial behavior motivation.
Q3

Is there a significant interaction effect between the shame groups and the three
levels of competence (no-information, low competence, and high competence) on
prosocial and self-defensive motivation?
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It was also hypothesized that the more competence perceived would yield higher mean
scores of prosocial motivation. This hypothesis was not supported as there was no statistically
significant interaction effect between shame and competency groups on the combined dependent
variables, F(4, 248) = .797, p = ..528, Wilks' Λ = .975, partial η2 = .013, nor was there a
statistically significant main effect on competency groups with prosocial and self-defensive
behavioral motivations , F(4, 248) = .519, p < .721, Wilks' Λ = .983, partial η2 = .008.
It was interesting to see that overall, the conditions of the experiment, namely telling
participants they had “some” or “a lot” of influence over the situation and the hypothetical
situation of telling or “almost” telling a friend’s secret, did not seem to influence the outcome
variables. As shown below in Figure 4.1, the means for the shame and competency groups on
prosocial and self-defensive motivation remained almost identical to each other regardless of the
group.
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Figure 4.1
Mean Group Differences

For Research Questions 2 and 3, assumptions were assessed before determining the
results of the data. There was a linear relationship between the dependent variables as assessed
by a scatterplot. There was no evidence of multicollinearity as assessed by Pearson correlation
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(|r| < 0.9). There were no multivariate outliers in the data as assessed by Mahalanobis distance (p
> .001); however, as assessed by a boxplot, seven univariate outliers were largely due to the
nature of the study and its dependent variables. The mode for prosocial motivation was 7, which
was the highest rating a participant could provide. Additionally, as assessed by histograms and
Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05), prosocial motivation was not normally distributed. Self-defensive
motivation was normally distributed. An attempt was made to transform prosocial motivation by
using a new logarithmic (base 10) variable for the strong, negatively skewed data; however, this
only shifted the data to be strongly, positively skewed (see Figure 4.2). Given that MANOVAs
are largely robust with regard to type I error (Bray & Maxwell, 1985; Weinfurt, 1995), analyses
progressed without using the transformed data. There was homogeneity of covariance matrices
as assessed by Box's M test (p = .307) and there was also homogeneity of variances as assessed
by Levene's Test of Homogeneity of Variance (p > .05).
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Figure 4.2
Comparison of Prosocial Behavioral Motivation’s Normality
Not Transformed

Transformed
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Research Question 4
Q4

Are higher parent scores of the IPPA associated with shame, self-defect, and
prosocial motivation?

It was also hypothesized that higher parent scores from both groups of the IPPA would be
significantly associated with the Self-Defect/Shame/Prosocial pathway (see Table 4.2). This
hypothesis was supported as the model demonstrated a statistically significant relationship
between the Gausel and Leach (2011) model’s prosocial pathway on attachment scores, F(3,
127) = .696, p < .005, adj. R2 = .101. Additionally, Prosocial Behavioral Motivation (p=.021) and
Self-Defect (p = .006) were associated with higher scores on the IPPA at .15 and -.182,
respectively. The slope coefficients represented a change in the dependent variable for a one unit
change in the independent variable regression coefficients and standard errors (Cohen et al.,
2003).

Table 4.2
Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment Analysis of Variance
df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Regression

Sum of
Squares
.9.950

3

3.317

4.768

.003

Residual

88.348

127

.696

Total

98.298

130

Dependent Variable: IPPA
Predictors: (Constant) Prosocial Motivation, Self-Defect, Shame
This multiple regression was used to predict attachment from the Gausel and Leach
(2011) model’s shame, self-defect, and prosocial behavioral motivation items. There was
linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the
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predicted values. There was independence of observations as assessed by a Durbin-Watson
statistic of 1.925 and homoscedasticity as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized
residuals versus unstandardized predicted values. There was some evidence of multicollinearity
as Shame and Self-Defect were positively correlated (.756); however, given that the tolerance
values were all greater than 0.1, this was not considered to be problematic (Hair et al., 2014).
With regard to outliers, influential, and leverage points, two studentized deleted residuals were
greater than ±3 standard deviations from the mean. These points were left in the model as there
were no leverage values greater than 0.2 (Huber, 1981) and values for Cook's distance were
above 1 (Cook & Weisberg, 1982). The assumption of normality was also met as assessed by a
histogram of the IPPA and a P-P Plot of regression standardized residuals.
With regard to the overall fit of the model, I used R, R2, and adjusted R2. An R is the
multiple correlation coefficient of the scores predicted by the regression model and the actual
values of the IPPA (Cohen et al., 2003). This point of reference provided a measure of the
strength of the linear association between these two variables and also the range between 0 and 1
of how well the model fit. The current model provided an R of .318, indicating a moderate
association. An R2 is the coefficient of determination that measured the proportion of variance in
the IPPA that could be explained by the independent variables (Cohen et al., 2003). This model
yielded an R2 of .101, meaning the addition of all independent variables into the model explained
10.1% of the variability in attachment scores. Additionally, the adjusted R2 was .08, which was
the most conservative estimate of the overall model fit (see Table 4.3). Given that collectively
these results reflected a model with a weak fit, the strength of this relationship is discussed more
in the limitations section of the next chapter.
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Table 4.3
Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment Model Summary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Std. Error of
Square
the Estimate
1
.318
.101
.080
.83406
Predictors: (Constant), Prosocial Motivation, SelfDefect, Shame
Dependent Variable: IPPA

Durbin
Watson
1.925

Research Question 5
Q5

Are higher parent scores of the ESS associated with other condemnation,
rejection, and self-defensive behavioral motivation?

It was also hypothesized that higher parent scores from both groups of the ESS would be
significantly associated with the other condemnation/rejection/self-defensive pathway (see Table
4.4). This hypothesis was supported as the model demonstrated a statistically significant
relationship among other condemnation, rejection, and self-defensive behavioral motivation on
shame-proneness scores, F(3, 126) = .322, p < .0005, adj. R2 = .181. Additionally, Self-defensive
Motivation (p=.000) was found to be associated with higher scores on the ESS at .213. The slope
coefficients represented a change in the dependent variable for a one unit change in the
independent variable regression coefficients and standard errors (Cohen et al., 2003).

Table 4.4
Experience of Shame Scale Analysis Variance
Sum of
df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Squares
Regression
10.115
3
3.372
10.478
.000
Residual
40.546
126
.322
Total
50.661
129
Dependent Variable: ESS
Predictors: (Constant), Self-Defensive Motivation, Rejection, Concern for Condemnation
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Regarding the assumptions, independence of observations was assessed by a Durbin
Watson statistic of 1.948 (see Table 4.5). The model also demonstrated linearity per a scatterplot
of the studentized residuals against the unstandardized predicted values. Additionally, linearity
was also found via partial regression plots of each independent variable. Similarly, the
studentized residuals scatter plot also revealed homoscedasticity. Regarding multicollinearity, no
correlations were above .7 and all Tolerance values were over .1, indicating no issues with
collinearity in the data set (Hair et al., 2014). Studentized deleted residuals, leverage points, and
Cook’s Distance were then used to check for outliers. No studentized deleted residuals were over
or below 3 and no leverage points extended past .2. Moreover, no Cook’s Distance values
extended beyond 1, indicating no potential points of excessive influence. Lastly, a histogram and
normal P-P Plot of regression standardized residuals indicated normality of the data set. The data
set exhibited an R2 of .2 and an Adjusted R2 of .181. This meant the addition of all independent
variables into a regression model explained 20% or 18.1% of the variability of shame-proneness.
Similar to the IPPA model discussed above, these results represented an overall weak model fit
and is discussed further in the limitations section of the next chapter.

Table 4.5
Experience of Shame Scale Model Summary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Std. Error of Durbin
Square
the Estimate
Watson
1
.447
.200
.181
.56727
1.948
Predictors: (Constant), Self-Defensive Motivation, Rejection, Concern for Condemnation
Dependent Variable: ESS
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Post Hoc Analysis
With respect to Research Questions 2 and 3, results indicated insignificant main effects
between the shame and competency groups on behavior motivation and an insignificant
interaction. Given how similar mean scores were between all of the shame and competency
groups, it begged the question of whether shame was successfully manipulated in the data. It was
hypothesized that shame was successfully manipulated and, thus, there should be a significant
difference in mean scores between groups with the clear-shame condition exhibiting a higher
mean than its near-shame counterpart.
There were 60 clear-shame and 71 near-shame participants. An independent-samples ttest was run to determine if there were differences in mean scores between the two groups. There
was one outlier in the data as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. There was no significant
difference in the model with and without the outlier so it was kept in the model. Shame scores
for the clear-shame group were normally distributed as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05);
however, the near-shame group demonstrated a strong positive skew. This positive skew
represented participant reports that they felt little to no shame following the experience that they
“almost” told their friend’s secret but maintained their trust in the end. Data were transformed
using a new logarithmic (base 10) variable for the strong positively skewed data; however, the
skew remained fairly the same and both transformed and untransformed data models yielded the
same result so the untransformed data were kept in the model. There was homogeneity of
variances as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = .301). The clear-shame
group exhibited higher shame scores (M = 4.3 ± 1.44) than the near-shame group (M = 2.55 ±
1.49) at a statistically significant difference of 1.74 (95% CI, 1.24 to 2.26), t(129) = 6.783, p =
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.000. This finding indicated shame was successfully manipulated within the model and that the
participants generally understood the hypothetical scenario (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.6
Independent T-Test Model Summary

Equal variance assumed

F

Sig.

T

df

1.076

.301

6.783
6.802

Equal variances not assumed

129

Sig (2tailed
.000

M
Differences
1.746

126.620

1.746

1.238

Summary
In summary, these results did not mirror the findings from de Hooge et al. (2010, 2011)
and Gausel et al. (2016) as there was no significant interaction or main effect for either of the
shame and competency groups on behavioral motivation. Post-hoc analysis revealed the intended
construct of inducing shame for the clear-shame group was successfully manipulated. This study
did not find evidence to support shame’s potential prosocial functionality. While there was some
support for the Gausel and Leach (2011) model pathways as shame and self-defect / rejection
and other condemnation were positively correlated with each other, overall correlations indicated
a stronger positive relationship with all feelings and appraisals than they did with either of the
behavioral motivations. With regard to attachment and shame-proneness, both models yielded
significant relationships with the prosocial and self-defensive pathways, respectively; however, it
is important to note that the overall model fit for both analyses was weak, which limited Gausel
and Leach’s (2011) pathway ability to predict the dependent variables.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This chapter discusses the results and potential implications of the study. First, I provide
a summary and rationale. Then, I offer an interpretation of the findings specifically for shame’s
functionality, social competence, attachment, and shame-proneness. Next, I provide the
implications of these results in both the areas of theoretical conceptualization, research, and
clinical application. Lastly, I offer the limitations of this study and provide concluding remarks.
Summary
The subject of shame and how it functions in human behavior has been an ongoing topic
of discussion. While the prevailing view of shame has conceptualized this emotion as a
motivator to withdraw and isolate (for a review, see Dempsey, 2017), a growing body of
literature found shame to act as a sociometer (de Hooge, 2014), monitoring tool (Scheff, 1988),
and moral barometer that could encourage people to engage in prosocial behavior and seek
atonement for one’s transgressions (Tangney et al., 2007). Indeed, both sides of the spectrum
viewed shame as an intense emotion of believing one is flawed and unworthy (Brown, 2006);
however, rather than viewing these opposing views as contradictory, it seemed evident to
approach shame, and its potential functionality, from a “perspectivist” standpoint that accepts
both positions as true depending on the situation where it is felt (Leach & Cidam, 2015). The
question in context was not so much “if” shame is functional in human behavior but rather
“when” and “why” people choose to respond prosocially versus self-defensively and what
variables moderated this process.
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This study sought to provide direction to attaining a clearer answer to shame’s
functionality and, furthermore, aimed to better understand the context for these answers. In the
current study, I randomly assigned participants into either the near-shame condition, where
participants read they almost told a secrete of a close friend but did not, or the clear-shame
condition where participants read they did tell the secret and, thus, hypothetically broke their
friend’s trust. Participants were then randomly assigned again into the no-information, lowcompetency, or high-competency groups that were differentiated by whether they had some or a
lot of influence to positively impact the situation (the no-information group received no
information). The outcome variables for this design were the Gausel and Leach (2011) model
constructs of prosocial and self-defensive behavioral motivation. By separating participants
based on the condition of committing a moral transgression and then measuring their behavior
motivations, I attempted to isolate shame to control for its effects.
Interpretation of Findings
This study largely replicated the design of Gausel et al. (2016) to measure shame’s
prosocial functionality and added de Hooge’s et al. (2010) competency groups to further
understand what moderated this process. The overarching purpose of this study was not only to
test the reliability of de Hooge et al. (2010, 2011) but also to improve the Gausel and Leach
(2011) model by potentially adding the role of social competence to its predictive pathways.
Moreover, by having participants complete the Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment (IPPA)
and Experience of Shame Scale (ESS) provided a foundation to further understanding why
people chose to respond to shame prosocially as opposed to self-defensively. Table 5.1 shows a
summary of the research questions and the results for this study described in the previous
chapter.
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Table 5.1
Research Questions and Results
Question
1
Are the relationships in the Gausel and Leach Model
reflected in the data?

Significance
Partially

2

Did shame motivate a prosocial response?

No

3

Did social competence moderate the relationship
between shame and a prosocial response?

No

4

Was the Gausel and Leach Model prosocial pathway
(self-defect, shame, and prosocial motivation) associated
with stronger attachment scores?

Yes

5

Was the Gausel and Leach Model self-defensive pathway
(other condemnation, rejection, and self-defensive
motivation) associated with higher shame-proneness
scores?

Yes

Prosocial Functionality
With regard to shame’s effect on behavioral motivation, the results found shame did not
motivate a difference in participant reports of wanting to behave prosocially or self-defensively.
This finding was inconsistent with the work of de Hooge et al. (2008, 2010, 2011, 2018) who
conducted 13 different experiments that found shame to be unanimously linked with prosocial
behaviors. Both de Hooge et al.’s experiments and the current study shared a similar sample
population of using college students from westernized cultures. Furthermore, these results were
also inconsistent with other works that found shame to be associated with reconciliation of
behaviors, key factors in processing through transgressions, amelioration of relationship
difficulties, and was a motivator for the fulfillment of social roles in society (for a review, see
Cibich et al., 2016).

87
It was unexpected to see how this study found conflicting reports of shame’s prosocial
functionality when it was largely a replication of a previous experiment done by Gausel et al.
(2016) who found significant differences between the clear-shame and near-shame groups on the
prosocial pathway (self-defect, shame, and prosocial motivation). They also found the feeling,
appraisals, and behavior motivations were separate constructs via factor analyses; however, the
current study found medium to strong correlates among all feelings and appraisals but not
behavior motivations. In essence, these results found rejection, inferiority, and shame were all
correlated with each other, which made sense as they are similar emotions; however, given the
model emphasized a strong relationship between self-defensive behavior motivation and
rejection, it was surprising not to see paralleled correlates between these pathways.
It is important to note the mean scores for both the clear-shame and near-shame groups
were relatively the same (scores ranged between 5-6 out of a maximum of 7), indicating that
regardless of the group, all participants indicated a higher score of wanting to behave prosocially.
This meant participants essentially said that even though they did not break trust and tell the
secret, the fact that they “almost” did was enough to report they would try to repair the situation
regardless. This seemed confusing considering participants in the near-shame group did not
actually break the trust of their friend nor did they commit a moral transgression. Despite the
lack of a moral failure, participants indicated they would behave prosocially.
These results begged the question of why participants, who did not commit a moral
transgression, indicated they would behave prosocially despite reporting significantly lower
mean scores of shame than their clear-shame group counterparts. Thielmann et al. (2020)
conducted a meta-analysis of 770 studies reporting on 3,523 effects of personality traits on
prosocial behavior and found that among 52 personality traits in the literature, 30 were found to

88
be positively associated with prosocial behaviors. Among these traits were shame-proneness (p̂ =
.07) and guilt-proneness (p̂ = .22), which demonstrated the second strongest effect size for
personality traits behind social value orientation (p̂ = .26). While shame wa different from
shame- and guilt-proneness from a broad scope, these findings provided further evidence the
self-conscious emotions collectively had some prosocial functionality in human behavior.
Thielmann et al. (2020) further provided a handful of variables that significantly
impacted as well as moderated the relationship between personality traits and prosocial behavior:
conflict of interests, repetition of interaction, behavior-contingent incentives, and experimental
deception. Among these facets, the authors also stressed that situational affordances and
subaffordances such as the possibility for exploitation/reciprocity, temporal conflict, and
uncertainty also affected trait expression and prosocial behavior. While it was not the scope of
this study to describe in detail each of these ingredients that impacted one’s choice to behave
prosocially, the main takeaway was there could have been a multitude of factors that caused the
inconsistent results of this study. Of those, it seemed plausible to address that generally speaking,
individuals might typically be willing to forego personal gains for the sake of others and not
behave selfishly (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). For example, Blanco et al. (2011) conducted four
prosocial behavior experiments with the same 72 participants and found people behaved more
prosocially (exhibiting generosity, reciprocity, and cooperation) than not. These findings were
similar to other experiments as well (Peysakhovich et al., 2014; Yamagishi et al., 2013), which
provided some evidence to suggest the sample population might have been prone to behaving
prosocially no matter what conditions were involved.
Thielmann et al. (2020) further emphasized that among the moderators discussed above,
hypothetical situations (behavior-contingent incentives) seemed to produce inflated results as the
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behavior itself was costless and it was generally easier to present more favorably. For example,
Moshagen et al. (2011) examined 2,043 participants’ responses to social dilemma games when
their choices and decisions were completely anonymous. Results revealed that “to a considerable
extent, self-reported cooperation is due to socially desirable responding, rather than actual
cooperativeness” (Moshagen et al., 2011, p. 6380). These findings were also synonymous with
others who found hypothetical situations inflated the results of the study (Baron, 2001;
Thielmann et al., 2016).
With these findings in mind, it seemed plausible the near-shame group reported similar
intentions to behave prosocially as the clear-shame group because the sample population might
have had a general proclivity to act selflessly. Moreover, the hypothetical nature of the
experimental design might have made it easy for participants to rate their prosocial intent more
favorably than what their actual behaviors would have entailed. Indeed, shame might motivate
prosocial behaviors as many other works have substantiated; however, the relationship between
shame and prosocial behavior might have been relatively weak and, thus, explained not only the
inconsistent results found in this study but also the segregated history of shame in the literature.
Social Competence
Like the shame groups discussed above, the mean scores among the three competency
groups for both the near and clear shame conditions were also similar across the total sample.
While it was hypothesized there would be a significant interaction effect between the
independent variables (shame and competency groups) and the dependent variables (prosocial
behavior and self-defensive motivation), there was not. There was also no significant main effect
of social competence on the dependent variables. These results were inconsistent with Leach and
Cidam (2015) who conducted a meta-analysis of 90 samples and found shame did motivate a
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constructive response when participants appraised the situation as more reparable as opposed to
less reparable. De Hooge et al. (2010, 2011) called this process social competence. The author
and colleagues found in a two-part article that included six experiments and a repeated measures
design that shame not only motivated a prosocial response but also found this process was
moderated by how participants appraised the situation.
Since the wording of the prompts and overarching design of the current study were nearly
identical to de Hooge et al. (2010), these results begged the question of why this experiment
yielded inconsistent results. The current study’s data showed participants’ amount of influence to
positively impact the situation had no effect on their intentions because they reported wanting to
behave prosocially regardless of condition. It was possible competence still had a moderating
role between feeling ashamed and acting prosocially; however, measures in this study did not
appear sensitive enough to capture how much a participant’s perceived influence of the situation
had on the outcome variables. Similar to how a multitude of factors impacted the relationship of
personality traits and prosocial behavior, it seemed evident that since the sample as a whole
reported strong intentions to behave prosocially, there would be no interaction effect between the
conditions. These findings did not necessarily disprove the plethora of evidence, suggesting
people tended to repair a situation when they appraised the situation as being more reparable.
Rather, these results might have highlighted the weak or inconsistent relationship between these
variables, especially when studied via a hypothetical situation where it was virtually costless to
behave favorably.
Attachment
With regard to attachment, the results found the prosocial pathway (shame, self-defect,
and prosocial behavior motivation) was associated with higher scores of attachment. This result
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was similar to other studies that found secure attachment to be related to positive peer
relationships and social competence among adolescents (for a meta-analysis, see Benson et al.,
2006). While it is important to note the overall model fit was relatively low, even for the social
sciences, this finding seemed to substantiate to some extent the claims of Tomkins (2008) and
other attachment theory principles that emphasized positive behavior correlations with secure
attachment (Flaherty & Sadler, 2011; Joireman et al., 2002). Shame, albeit uncomfortable, might
be a vital ingredient to the parent-child relationship in that it offers feedback on social rules,
norms, and values. Furthermore, the propensity for one to appraise a moral transgression as a
personal defect, feel ashamed for their wrongdoing, and then act prosocially seemed to be
consistent with other works that found secure attachment to be strongly associated with the
ability to regulate negative emotions, express positive feelings, and form long-term intimate
relationships (Armsden & Greenberg, 1987; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Furman &
Wehner, 1994).
Shame-Proneness
As for shame-proneness, results indicated the self-defensive pathway (other
condemnation, rejection, and self-defensive behavior motivation) was associated with higher
scores on the Experience of Shame Scale (ESS; Andrews et al., 2002). These results seemed to
be consistent with other studies on shame-proneness that found it to be related to a variety of
other aversive symptoms and behaviors (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Schoenleber & Berenbaum,
2012). Furthermore, these results also seemed to provide additional understanding of why people
might tend to manage moral transgressions self-defensively. As Tomkins (2008) emphasized,
people who tend to socially withdraw have formed a schematic script that seeking to repair,
atone, or ameliorate would not increase positive affect. These results seemed to also provide
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evidence that shame-proneness was different from a situational experience of shame in that the
lack of differentiation between the two might be the answer to how shame fulfilled such diverse
roles in the literature. Shame proneness might in fact be more indicative of a self-defensive
response, while a situational experience or episodic state of feeling ashamed might have the
potential to motivate a prosocial response.
Implications
Despite the current study’s partial inconsistencies with other research regarding the
potential, prosocial functionality of shame, the data provides a foundation for future direction in
the domains of theory, research, and clinical application. In essence, the hypothetical situation of
telling a friend’s secret in an online format provided feedback on how not to investigate the
construct of shame. The associations between shame-proneness and attachment, with their
corresponding Gausel and Leach (2011) model pathways, provided context for why people might
be more prone to act prosocially as opposed to self-defensively following a shameful experience.
Theoretical Conceptualization
The results of this study were inconsistent with prior research that found shame
motivated prosocial behavior. As discussed previously, there seemed to be an abundance of
potential factors that caused this to happen. One of these reasons might be that hypothetical
situations present a potential confounding effect where intentions to behave prosocially are easier
to report than objectively engaging in physical, prosocial behavior. What seemed to be especially
relevant was the participants generally indicated they wanted to behave prosocially regardless of
feelings, appraisals, or amount of influence they had over the situation. This seemed to parallel
the tenets of affect theory, which emphasized that people want to maximize positive affect
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consistently as much as possible. Behaving prosocially in and of itself might be motivation and
reward enough to manage shame more constructively.
Consistent with other theoretical works, shame might still serve as a feedback device to
alert humans something is wrong and something needs to be done (approach or withdraw);
however, the functionality of shame might stop there and other factors such as personality,
situational affordances, culture, and interpersonal risks might be more salient in ultimately
directing one’s choice on behavior. Social competence might not be as central to this process as
previously theorized; instead, it might simply be one of the many variables involved in this
process. Unfortunately, it was unclear to understand if and how many other studies, that have
investigated the role of shame and prosocial behavior, might have also found inconsistent results
due to insignificant findings receiving substantially less attention in peer reviewed journals than
articles that found significance (file drawer phenomena; Rosenthal, 1979). To advance theory,
future research needs to include studies like this that found inconsistent results from the majority.
Given that Thielmann et al. (2020) found 30 personality traits that demonstrated positive effect
sizes for prosocial behavior, it stands to reason the process of managing shame depends on a
myriad of factors.
This study’s investigation of shame-proneness and attachment seemed to provide
direction in this process to understand shame’s functionality as results did provide context for
Gausel and Leach’s (2011) prosocial and self-defensive pathways. Results demonstrated
associations, with relatively low predictability, for secure attachment and the prosocial pathway
as well as shame-proneness and the self-defensive pathway. These findings seemed to offer
evidence in support of affect theory’s emphasis on script formation and how one’s family of
origin, their first social system, had some relationship to how people think, feel, and intend to

94
behave following a moral transgression. Future research might advance shame’s theoretical
conceptualization by further testing the relationship between attachment, shame, and prosocial
behavior when state shame is differentiated from shame-proneness. Specifically, it would be
interesting to understand more about how attachment impacts a prosocial response and to what
degree.
Research
In addition to further understanding the theoretical conceptualization of shame, this study
illuminated areas of improvement in overall design and instrumentation. Results of this study
showed participants responded to the Gausel and Leach (2011) model items in extreme fashion
which created violations in normality specifically for prosocial behavior motivation and shame.
This was seemingly the result of a lack of items per construct that failed to provide a sensitive
degree to which participants could report on certain variables. For example, the mode of
prosocial behavior motivation was 7, which was the highest response a participant could provide.
Still, the Gausel and Leach model offered the most comprehensive conceptualization of shame
and its behavior motivation correlates to date; thus, it is encouraged that future research continue
to use this model as a framework for future research. Instead of using the Gausel and Leach
model as a measure, future experiments could instead utilize different scales and questionnaires
to operationalize the constructs of the feelings, appraisals, and behavior motivations discussed in
the model.
Robins et al. (2007) provided a review of both self-report and nonverbal measures of the
self-conscious emotions. In their review, the authors differentiated between state or episodic
experiences of self-conscious emotions and trait or dispositional scales. Since shame-proneness
(trait shame) might be more reflective of an unhealthy script or personality trait, it is strongly
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encouraged to continue to differentiate shame-proneness from a state of feeling ashamed as the
latter has shown considerable evidence to be associated with prosocial behaviors. The State
Shame and Guilt Scale (Marschall et al., 1994) has shown strong reliability (Cronbach alpha
coefficients above .8) and might, therefore, be a more sensitive measure that could report on the
situational experience of shame. Moreover, Martí-Vilar et al. (2019) provided a systematic
review of prosocial behavior measures and found different instruments showed strong
psychometrics across various groups and populations.
With regard to overall design, this study found inconsistent results that shame did not
motivate a prosocial response; rather, participants indicated prosocial intent regardless of
condition, feelings, or appraisals. These findings seemed to encourage the need for an
experimental design that measures actual behaviors as opposed to hypothetical intentions as the
latter is virtually costless and easy to present self-favorably. Future research could also utilize a
social-desirability measure that might otherwise control for a participant’s proclivity to present
self-favorably. Similarly, it also seemed like researchers would increase their generalizability of
findings if the experiment was completed in-person as opposed to online. Despite shame being
more associated with a concern for self-image than social-image (de Hooge et al., 2010, 2011;
Gausel & Leach, 2011), it was still felt within the context of interpersonal relationships and,
therefore, future studies measuring objective, physical prosocial behavior might accomplish this
best by using an in-person format. It is important to note the largest difference between this study
and those it was largely replicated from was it was online as opposed to in-person format and so,
these inconsistent results might be attributable to in-person socialization.
Lastly, it is also encouraged that future research continue to use a moral transgression as
opposed to a competence-based transgression to induce shame in experimental designs as
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academic performance seems more indicative of guilt than it does shame (de Hooge, 2014;
Dempsey, 2017; Gausel et al., 2016). While Gausel et al. (2012, 2016) made this distinction, de
Hooge et al. (2008, 2010, 2011, 2018) largely measured the prosocial functionality of shame
through competence-based transgressions. Since it stands to reasons that performing poorly on
an exam or group project in school is reflective of one’s academic behaviors, future research
could improve the literature’s understanding of shame by inducing a moral transgression as this
would be more indicative of one’s loyalty, honesty, or credibility.
Clinical Application
The results of the current study indicated that when participants were introduced to a
hypothetical situation, they might have been prone to reporting high scores of prosocial behavior
intent. This might be due to wanting to present self-favorably and the cost of reporting intent is
substantially smaller than engaging in actual behaviors. Given the growing body of literature that
showed shame to motivate prosocial behavior (for a review, see Cibich et al., 2016), it seemed
understandable to suggest shame had some prosocial functionality. However, this functionality
might be dependent on or outweighed by a host of other factors such as personality
characteristics (shame-proneness), conflict of interests, incentives, potential exploitation, and
possible reciprocity (for a meta-analysis, see Thielmann et al., 2016). Indeed, the process of a
person choosing how to behave is complex and multifaceted, which seemed especially apparent
when understanding how shame could impact clients in therapy.
Dearing et al. (2011) described in detail how to treat, manage, and facilitate healing while
working with clients who presented with shame. In their book, Shame in the Therapy Hour, the
authors provided multiple theoretical perspectives on how to treat a variety of symptomology
such as substance abuse, borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress, and eating
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disorders. Of these theoretical perspectives, Greenberg and Iwakabe (2011) applied emotionfocused theory to working with shame. They differentiated between adaptive and maladaptive
shame, stating the former had the potential to motivate “social reconciliation by evoking
affiliative response, sympathy, and forgiveness from other” while the latter “often results from
past trauma or a poor attachment history (that), leads to withdrawal and avoidance” (Greenberg
& Iwakabe, 2011, p. 72). These authors further emphasized that working effectively with shame
involved four key principles: relational validation, accessing and acknowledging shame,
regulating shame, and transforming shame.
With these principles and the results of the current study in mind, it seems evident that
clinicians working with shame would benefit from first assessing how shame functioned for their
client. Does it help motivate approach or withdraw behaviors? Feeling ashamed and choosing to
behave prosocially seems to be representative of a person recognizing they are at fault and
believe they can improve. Is the client feeling shame from a singular experience or do their
symptoms reflect more of a personality characteristic where shame is felt often and excessively?
This study found preliminary support for a relationship between shame-proneness and the Gausel
and Leach (2011) model self-defensive pathway. Understanding the duration of how much and
often a client feels ashamed of themselves over the course of their development might be
productive areas for the clinician and client to further understand. Lastly, how does the client
appraise the transgression? If the client appraises the situation as a problem with themselves but
that the transgression is not malleable or impossible to change, then this might be more
representative of inferiority than shame, which does not lead to prosocial behavior. Additionally,
if the client typically withdraws and isolates, then this might be because they have learned
through past experiences or attachment with caregivers that their attempts to fix, ameliorate, or
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atone for wrongdoings are often unsuccessful. Indeed, asking these and other questions regarding
the functionality and presentation of shame and its accompanying behaviors might allow
clinicians to be more intentional with their interventions.
Limitations
In this study, the most prominent limitation to further understanding and expanding upon
the literature’s understanding of shame was the proclivity for participants to indicate, to a high
degree, self-favorable intentions to behave prosocially. As previously described, the mode for
prosocial motivation was a 7 out of 7, which reflected a larger theme of the results where
participants reported they would behave prosocially regardless of feeling various amounts of
shame or influence about the situation. This was not a problem reported in either of the
experiments from which this study’s design was largely replicated (de Hooge et al., 2010; Gausel
et al., 2016); however, the costless nature of reporting hypothetical intent versus actual behaviors
might have confounded and explained the insignificant results of shame’s prosocial functionality
or lack thereof. Future research might control for this extraneous variable by not only measuring
actual behaviors (e.g., prosocial dilemma games; Thielmann et al., 2020) but also include a
social-desirability measure that could control for this potential impact.
There were also ongoing issues of outliers and non-normality that caused violation of
assumptions. Specifically, prosocial motivation and the measured construct of shame were not
normally distributed and contained outliers. The current study managed this by primarily testing
the model with transformed and untransformed data and found the results remained the same for
both the two-way MANOVA and independent samples t-test. As Pituch and Stevens (2016)
emphasized, non-normality negatively impacts the probability of making an incorrect
interpretation of the model; however, Bray and Maxwell (1985) among others emphasized that
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analysis of variances are generally robust to these errors. Therefore, the current study could still
be a credible source of evidence regarding the concepts discussed. These normality violations
seemed to have been the result of the Gausel and Leach (2011) model as a measurement tool.
Rather than the normality violation being the result of the population, the Gausel and Leach
model items failed to provide the needed sensitivity required to examine a normal distribution of
scores.
Indeed, the current study utilized a college student sample population where all
participants identified as undergraduate and graduate students from the same Mid-west
university. While this was likely not the cause of the normality violations experienced, it did
decrease the ability to which this study’s results could be generalizable to the population. As
noted previously, college students share some similarities: they are generally western, educated,
and from industrialized, rich, and democratic countries (Kazdin, 1992); however, with regard to
the study of human emotions, this population is generally considered adequate. For example,
Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) conducted a meta-analysis on emotion recognition within and
across cultures and found that while there were some in-group advantages, people as a whole
generally recognized and interpreted emotions universally. Moreover, several studies that
investigated the constructs in this study also utilized a college student population without any
known, reported problems.
Another limitation to this study was the low model fits for both regression analyses that
tested the associations for shame-proneness and attachment. For shame-proneness, the data
exhibited an R2 of .2 and an adjusted R2 of .181, meaning the self-defensive pathway of the
Gausel and Leach (2011) model explained roughly 20% and 18.1% of the variability in ESS
scores. For attachment, the model yielded an R2 of .101 and an adjusted R2 was .08. Even for the
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social sciences, which generally indicate lower models of fit (Pituch & Stevens, 2016), these
results should be interpreted with caution. The current study discussed these results within the
context of how there was an association between these constructs instead of reporting on the
model’s overall predictability or lack thereof. Despite this limitation, subsequent work could now
test additional hypotheses about paths, mechanisms, and moderators that might better explain or
elaborate the connection between attachment, shame-proneness, and the Gausel and Leach
model.
Conclusion
This study investigated the role of shame on prosocial behavior and found the current
sample generally indicated prosocial intentions despite their feelings, appraisals, and whether or
not they were told they had some, a lot, or no information regarding the amount of influence they
had in positively impacting the situation. These results seemed to not necessarily disprove
shame’s potential prosocial functionality but rather direct future research toward the many
factors that influence prosocial behavior. Rather than measuring intentions, future research needs
to assess actual behaviors in situations that are ethical but not hypothetical. Additionally, this
study also provided substantive evidence that supported the tenets of affect theory regarding the
integral role one’s attachment to caregivers has in managing shame prosocially. Furthermore,
this study offered some evidence to suggest shame-proneness might be more reflective of selfdefensive behavior in comparison to its state or episodic shame counterpart.
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APPENDIX A
THE GAUSEL AND LEACH MODEL

120

Note. Adapted from Gausel and Leach (2011).
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Gausel and Leach Model Permission
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APPENDIX B
RESEARCH DESIGN
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APPENDIX C
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
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Please read the items below and put a check in the box that best describes you. In order to keep
your responses anonymous, do not write your name on this questionnaire.
1. Gender:
a. Male____ Female ____ Transgender female _____ Transgender male ____ Genderqueer
_____ and other (specify) _____
2. Age: _____
3. Race/Ethnicity
a. White____ Black or African American____ American Indian or Alaska Native____
Asian ____ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander ______
b. Hispanic______ Non-Hispanic ______
4. Were you born in the United States of America?
a. Yes____ No____ (If no, please specify place of birth)______
5. Were your parents born in the United States of America?
a. Yes____ No____ (If no, please specify place of birth)______
6. Were you raised in an:
a. Intact Family _____ Non-Intact Family____
7. If raised in a non intact family, which best describes your family?
a. Single Parent _____ Divorced Parents ____ Deceased Parent _____ Other _____8. Year of college you are currently in:
a. Freshman____ Sophomore _____ Junior ____ Senior ____
9. Do you live:
a. On campus____ at home_____ off campus_______
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APPENDIX D
EXPERIENCE OF SHAME SCALE
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Permission to Use Experience of Shame Scale
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APPENDIX E
INVENTORY OF PARENT AND PEER ATTACHMENT
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Permission to Use Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment
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Scoring Instructions
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APPENDIX F
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL
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APPENDIX G
INFORMED CONSENT
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CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
Project Title: Expanding the Conceptualization and Applied Role of Shame: How are Reparation
Efforts Impacted by Parental Attachment and Perceived Competence Following a Shameful
Experience?
Researcher: Nate Burrow, Counseling Psychology Ph.D. Student
Phone Number: xxx-xxx-xxxx
Research Advisor: Brian Johnson, PhD Brian.Johnson@unco.edu
Research Advisor: Kenneth Parnell, PhD Kenneth.Parnell@unco.edu
The purpose of this study is to investigate college student’s relationships with caregivers and
their experiences with shame. As a participant in this research, you will be asked to complete an
online survey asking you to answer questions surrounding these experiences and perceptions. At
the end of the survey, you will also be asked several demographic questions such as “What is
your age?” and “What gender do you identify as?” The survey includes a total of 83 questions
that should last approximately 10 - 20 minutes in duration. After you submit your survey
responses, you will be debriefed about the study.
To participate in this study, you must be 18 or older. If you choose to participate, the risks
inherent in this study are minimal and no greater than those normally encountered during regular
classroom participation. A list of psychological resources are provided at the end of the consent
form should you feel any distress from completing the survey. One benefit of participating in this
study is that it may increase self-awareness of your parental relationship and perception of life.
Data will be treated as confidential. Once data have been collected, responses will be entered as
numerical codes. Only the researcher and the faculty supervisor will have access to the data. All
data will be stored on a password protected computer. All results will be reported in aggregate
form to protect confidentiality of individual respondents. If you are completing this study for
extra credit, you may print out the certificate granted to you at the end of the survey. Each
response will receive and individual number so as to prevent the sharing of the same certificate
for multiple students.
Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and if you begin
participation you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time. Having read this form,
please complete the survey if you would like to participate in this research study.
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By completing this survey, you give your permission to be included in this study as a
participant. It is of the utmost importance that the answers provided are honest and sincere.
Please keep or print this form for your records. If you have any concerns about your selection or
treatment as a research participant, please contact Nicole Morse, Office of Research, Kepner
Hall, University of Northern Colorado Greeley, CO 80639; 970-351-1910.
Debriefing Information:
The study you just participated in was conducted to research the predictive pathways that lead
some, but not others to engage in prosocial behavior. This study also tested for relationships
among shame-proneness and parental attachment constructs Specifically, this study was designed
to assess how stronger parental attachment and greater scores of shame-proneness were
associated with making amends for a moral transgression. The goal of this study was to provide
further direction in managing, treating, and coping with one of mankind’s most powerful
emotions thus, expanding the literature on the functionality of shame. Should you feel any
distress after completing this survey, below is a list of possible resources:
• National Suicide Prevention Lifeline, 1-800-273-8255
• Colorado Crisis Services, 1-844-493-TALK, Text “TALK” to 38255
• Psychological Services Clinic at UNC, McKee Hall Rm 247, 970-351-1645,
psc.unc@unco.edu
• UNCO Counseling Center, Cassidy Hall Second Floor, 970-351-2496, 24/7 Crisis
Response
• North Range Behavioral Health Emergency Line: 970-347-2120
• Assault Survivor Advocacy Program (ASAP) Hotline: 970-351-4040
• Colorado Domestic Violence Hotline: 1-800-778-7091
• National Domestic Violence Hotline: 1-800-799-SAFE
• Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network (RAINN): 1-800-656-HOPE
If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Nate Burrow
xxxx. If you have any concerns about your selection or treatment as a research participant, please
contact Nicole Morse, Research Compliance Manager, University of Northern Colorado at
Nicole.morse@unco.edu or 970-351-1910.

